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A GLOBAL PARADIGM SHATTERED: THE 
JURISDICTIONAL NIHILISM OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S ABDUCTION DECISION IN 
ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 
Andrew L. Strauss* 
We have entered into a new historical era with the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of the global economy. No longer locked into a mortal struggle 
in the furtherance of what were perceived to be life's most fundamental val- 
ues and even societal survival, there is now an unprecedented opportunity to 
build a global system of government founded on the same civilizing precepts 
of legal authority upon which we in the United States have based our domes- 
tic order. The potential, if the political will can be summoned, is the creation 
of a world structure where conflict over principles, as well as competition for 
power, can be resolved peaceably through the media of negotiation, compro- 
mise, and adjudication based on legal norms, rather than through violence 
and destruction. 
The current globalization of the world economy provides new, compel- 
ling reasons for strengthening the international legal order in general, and it 
particularly gives us new incentive to protect and even enhance the specific 
body of international law that defines the boundaries of state jurisdictional 
authority. The historic international trade in goods and services is being 
eclipsed by the internationalization of the production process itse1f.l This 
creates a new imperative that such globalized activity be effectively regu- 
lated. To meet this need, national regulatory authority must be defined as 
clearly as possible by a framework that delineates the boundaries of state 
jurisdiction. Not to meet this challenge is to invite regulatory confusion, 
political conflict, and economic inefficiency. 
The tragedy of United States v. A l varez -Ma~ha in ,~  the United States 
Supreme Court's first post-Cold War international decision, is that the Court 
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law; B.A., Woodrow Wilson School, 
Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I would like to express my 
warm appreciation for the great dedication given to this project by my research assistants, 
Heather Satterfield and Bob Lohr. I would also like to thank Alan Garfield, Mary Kate Kear- 
ney, Patrick Kelly, Marty Kotler, Mary Brigid McManamon, Laura Ray, and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter for their very helpful comments and criticisms. 
1. See generally JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE 
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD passim (1992) (discussing the political 
implications of global production); ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OUR- 
SELVES FOR 21s~-CENTURY CAPITALISM passim (1991) (presenting anecdotal and statistical evi- 
dence of the internationalization of the production process). 
2. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). 
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squandered this great historic moment by refusing, for the first time, to up- 
hold the international law which provides for the coherent allocation of inter- 
national jurisdictional authority over criminal defendants. The Court's 
decision dramatically undermined the advancement of international law gen- 
erally, and the preservation of a coherent allocation of state regulatory au- 
thority in the increasingly globalized area of enforcing laws that prohibit 
criminal conduct. This article reveals the unfortunate truth that the Supreme 
Court in Alvarez-Machain shattered the existing international jurisdictional 
~ a r a d i g m , ~  and in its place offered not a coherent regulatory alternative, but 
jurisdictional nihilism. If adopted by other countries, the Court's approach 
can only lead to global regulatory confusion. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist overturned the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 by ruling that the 
United States could assert personal jurisdiction over Humberto Alvarez- 
M a ~ h a i n . ~  Alvarez-Machain was a Mexican doctor who was abducted from 
3. As used in this article, the word "paradigm" refers to a generally accepted model that 
describes a social institution. Thomas Kuhn very much affected our contemporary understand- 
ing of the word. He employed it to denote a generally accepted conceptual framework that 
explains natural phenomena. The word has been increasingly used, however, by social scientists 
to explain human institutions. THOMAS . KUHN, T m  S T R U ~ R E  OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
43-51 (1962). 
4. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was indicted and brought before the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California. He moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
because he had been abducted by the United States government in violation of the Mexican- 
American Extradition Treaty. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601 (C.D. Cal. 
1990), aff'd sub nom.  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 
S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The district court granted the motion and ordered the doctor's repatriation to 
Mexico based upon the finding that the treaty impliedly prohibited one nation from violating the 
territorial integrity of another. Id. at 610, 614. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci- 
sion based upon its prior holding that an abduction conducted in Mexican territory, sponsored 
by the United States and without Mexico's consent, was a violation of the treaty. United States 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Verdugo- 
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 
(1992)). The circuit court agreed that the proper remedy for the treaty violation was dismissal of 
the indictment and repatriation of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to Mexico. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. United States v. Alva- 
rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). On remand, the district court judge dismissed the charges 
at the close of the prosecution's case for lack of evidence. See Jim Newton, Judge Orders 
Camarena Case Defendant Freed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A1 (reporting insufficient proof 
offered to show that Dr. Alvarez-Machain had given injections to agent Camarena); Seth 
Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N . Y .  TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20 (same). 
5. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was allegedly involved in the 1985 abduction and murder of DEA 
Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in Guadalajara, Mexico. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. 
Camarena had been investigating suspected drug lord Rafael Caro-Quintero who, together with 
Ernesto Fornesca, was alleged to have ordered the agent's death. Dr. Alvarez-Machain alleg- 
edly injected Camarena with lidocaine to keep him alive for prolonged torture by drug kingpins. 
Long Arm of the Law; A Decision To Uphold an International Kidnapping Alarms Latin 
America, TIME, June 29,1992, at 30. The doctor was one of 22 persons indicted for involvement 
in the agent's abduction and murder. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.  Supp. at 602. The doctor was 
charged under 18 U.S.C. $9 371, 1959 (1988) (conspiracy to commit violence in furtherance of 
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his office in Guadalajara, Mexico, transported to the United States by bounty 
hunters whom the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had hired,6 and held in 
the United States despite Mexico's protest and demands for his r e t ~ r n . ~  The 
Court did not dispute Dr. Alvarez-Machain's argument that general interna- 
tional jurisdictional law, in the cause of protecting Mexico's territorial sover- 
eignty, prohibited the United States from asserting personal jurisdiction over 
him.8 In fact, the Court admitted that the kidnapping "may be in violation of 
general international law  principle^."^ 
In disregarding the international law of jurisdiction, the Court for the 
first time explicitly distinguished between abductions that violate general 
principles of international law and those that violate extradition treaty obli- 
gations. The Court determined that only those abductions that violate treaty 
obligations are cause for denying jurisdiction.l0 The understanding of the 
general principles of international law that allows the Court to draw this dis- 
tinction is the crux of the decision. It not only results in the Court's failure to 
apply general international jurisdictional law, but it correspondingly wrongly 
causes the Court to focus its analysis on the United States-Mexican bilateral 
extradition treatyl1 and, ultimately, to conclude that the absence of an anti- 
abduction provision in that treaty provided a legally sufficient basis for the 
United States to kidnap Dr. Alvarez-Machain.12 
Although the Court concluded that it need not apply the international 
law of jurisdiction, the Court failed to articulate the basic understanding of 
racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. 9 1959(a)(2) (1988) (violence in furtherance of racketeering 
activity); 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(5), (c) (1988) (conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent); 18 U.S.C. 
1201(a)(5) (1988) (kidnapping of a federal agent); and 18 U.S.C. §§ l l l l ( a ) ,  1114 (1988 & 
Supp. I11 1991) (felony murder of a federal agent). Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190 n.1. 
6. The DEA had promised to pay Mexican contacts for Dr. Alvarez-Machain's delivery to 
the United States. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603. Mexicans, as agents of the DEA, kid- 
napped Dr. Alvarez-Machain from his medical offices in Guadalajara, Mexico, and flew him to 
El Paso, Texas, where he was taken into custody. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. 
7. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. Mexico responded to the abduction by a timely 
diplomatic note to the United States Department of State from the Mexican Embassy requesting 
details of any possible United States involvement in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction. A sec- 
ond diplomatic note to the Department of State demanded Dr. Alvarez-Machain's return and 
voiced the Mexican government's protest that the doctor's kidnapping violated the procedures 
established in the extradition treaty. A third diplomatic note requested the extradition of DEA 
special agent Hector Berrellez and DEA informant Antonio Garate-Bustamante for prosecution 
in Mexico for crimes related to the abduction. Id.  at 2196 n.16, 2197 nn.1-2. 
8. Id.  at 2195. 
9. Id.  at 2196. This article refers to "international law" as the system of law governing 
relations between nation-states, rather than the law governing domestic relations within the re- 
spective nation-states. Recognized sources of international law include treaties, custom, and 
general principles of law common to civilized countries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR- 
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD)]; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 art. 38(l)(a)-(c), 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060. See infra note 97 for further explanation of sources of international law. 
10. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197. 
11. Id.  at 2194-97. 
12. Id. at 2195-96. 
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jurisdiction upon which its analysis was built, the provisions of the interna- 
tional law of jurisdiction governing abductions, or the relationship between 
international law and domestic law which would lead the Court to an under- 
standing of which authority to apply. In order, therefore, to determine 
whether the Court should have applied the international law of jurisdiction, I 
first describe how the Court should have approached the type of jurisdic- 
tional concerns found in the Alvarez-Machain case. Specifically, I explain 
why the Court should have ascertained and applied the legal authority which 
actually granted the relevant jurisdictional authority to the United States. I 
then demonstrate why the international law of jurisdiction, which prohibits 
abductions, is that legal authority. Finally, I explain why the doctrine of dual- 
ism, which allows states to disregard substantive international law, cannot be 
applied to international jurisdictional law. This article does not attempt to 
establish a normative basis for a new international jurisdictional system. 
Rather, operating within the positivist tradition,13 this article is limited to 
assessing whether the Alvarez-Machain Court applied the existing jurisdic- 
tional paradigm in holding that the United States had personal jurisdiction 
over Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 
To develop the above issues, this article is specifically structured as fol- 
lows: Part I identifies the nature of the jurisdictional issues suggested by the 
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. I differentiate between the utilization of 
jurisdictional limits as a mechanism to allocate authority between governing 
entities and the utilization of jurisdictional limits as a means to protect the 
rights of defendants. I then explain why the body of this article focuses on 
the jurisdictional law which is concerned with allocating authority between 
governing entities. In Part 11, I present the relevant allocational jurisdictional 
framework. This framework provides that whenever faced with a choice be- 
tween competing jurisdictional laws, emanating from more than one author- 
ity, which could possibly be applied to limit the jurisdictional power of a 
governing entity, courts should apply the law from the authority that actually 
grants jurisdiction to that governing entity. In Part 111, I describe the para- 
digm underlying the nation-state system. I explore the inherent implications 
of the concept of territorial sovereignty as they relate to the international 
jurisdictional law specifically prescribing abductions. In Part IV, I explain 
why another implication of this concept of territorial sovereignty is that inter- 
national law is the source of jurisdictional law that should be applied in our 
domestic courts. After demonstrating that the Alvarez-Machain Court as- 
sumed that the United States Constitution was the source of applicable juris- 
dictional law, I explain that the Court erred in failing to apply the 
international law of jurisdiction as the correct authority. In Part V, I review 
the specifics of the Court's interpretation of the United States-Mexican bilat- 
eral extradition treaty and demonstrate that the Court employed the treaty as 
13. A positivist legal analysis attempts to discern the law as it has actually developed. In 
contrast, a normative analysis offers rationale to justify a given legal standard. Legal positivism 
in international law is generally associated with the idea that legitimate international legal au- 
thority flows primarily from the consent of nation-states. 
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a decoy to displace the international law of jurisdiction that prohibits abduc- 
tions. I show how the Court interpreted the treaty in such a way so as effec- 
tively to create an international law of its own invention that permitted Dr. 
Alvarez-Machain's abduction. In Part VI, I explain that the dualist theory of 
the relationship between the domestic and international legal systems, which 
provides a theoretical basis for judicial deference to state violations of sub- 
stantive international law, cannot be extended to permit state violations of 
international jurisdictional law. In Part VII, I review past judicial precedent 
and conclude that until the Alvarez-Machain decision, abduction cases in the 
United States had been consistent with the paradigm underlying the state 
system described in this article. Finally, this article concludes with an assess- 
ment of the detrimental implications of the Alvarez-Machain opinion. 
In order to analyze the Alvarez-Machain decision properly, one must 
understand the nature of the jurisdictional issue presented in the case. This 
understanding will make it possible to derive a basic framework which can be 
used to assess the decision. The DEA's commissioned abduction of Dr. Al- 
varez-Machain from Mexico14 raises jurisdictional concerns about both the 
allocation of governmental authority and the protection of the defendants' 
rights. Jurisdictional concerns surrounding the allocation of governmental 
authority raise the question of whether the United States, acting without 
Mexico's permission, can legally exercise law enforcement activities within 
Mexican territory. Jurisdictional concerns about protecting the rights of de- 
fendants raise the question of whether fugitives themselves enjoy a basic 
right not to be abducted by a foreign government, and if so, whether the 
United States has the power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant abducted 
in such a manner. 
The jurisdictional analysis presented in this article, however, only at- 
tempts to understand and critique the basis for the Supreme Court's determi- 
nation that the United States courts need not apply the international law 
which concerns the allocation of authority between nation-states. (I will call 
this "allocational jurisdiction.") While there are substantial indications that 
international law has progressed both to recognize the right of defendants to 
be free from arbitrary arrests and to view derogations of such rights as having 
jurisdictional implications, a detailed discussion of the implications of this 
development for the Alvarez-Machain decision is outside the parameters of 
this article.15 Having so narrowed the issue, I begin my analysis by construct- 
14. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
15. The Alvarez-Machain opinion was likely premised on the assumption that this law does 
not exist. The Court failed to discuss the possibility that international law recognizes the rights of 
a defendant not to be abducted, much less whether that right should be applied in the United 
States. Accordingly, this article will also be limited to assessing the implication for domestic 
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ing a framework that demonstrates the need for courts to identify the proper 
legal authority that determines the jurisdictional competence of the govern- 
mental entity whose jurisdictional power is in question. 
judicial application which flows from the clearly existing jurisdictional paradigm allocating au- 
thority between nation-states. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text. By so limiting my 
task, I do not wish to imply, however, either that international law does not protect the right of 
defendants or that this law should not be applied by American courts. Assuming two progres- 
sive changes within international law have transpired, the basis for a doctrine that would bar the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction gained in violation of a defendant's rights would exist. 
First, of course, it would have to be established that there is an international right not to be 
subject to state-sponsored abductions. While this right is not specifically guaranteed in any of 
the international human rights instruments, several commentators have convincingly argued that 
it is within the penumbra of rights protecting individuals against arbitrary governmental actions 
which are not, to use the American terminology, in accord with due process of law. John 
Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from Kidnapping of 
Suspected Terrorists, 10 H U M .  RTS. Q. 193, 204-05 (1988) ("In any case of abduction, there is 
violation of personal liberty, of the right to be detained under legal authority, of the right of 
emigration, of the right to remain in a state until expelled, and of the right to seek asylum."); see 
also Martin Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly Developing Znternational Standard, 
14 AKRON L. REV. 27, 37 (1980) ("There has been a major development in international law 
which justifies a further search for international protection for the victims of extraterritorial 
abductions: the development, over the past several decades, of international human rights law 
and the concomitant [sic] change in status of the individual into a subject of international law."). 
In addition to establishing the international right not to be subject to state sponsored abduc- 
tions, for jurisdiction to be defeated, it would also have to be established that a state does not 
have legal authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence was secured by a 
violation of that international right. Currently, as this article will explain, governing entities do 
not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction that encroaches on the exclusive jurisdiction of 
other states. Nonetheless, personal jurisdiction in criminal cases has not been so explicitly tied 
to international human rights concerns. American courts have, however, begun to create a do- 
mestic doctrine connecting the two concepts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec- 
ond Circuit introduced the doctrine when it ruled that due process required the court to divest 
itself of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who was tortured while being abducted from 
overseas. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The court based its decision 
upon the "shock the conscience" test associated with the constitutional concept of fundamental 
fairness as first enunciated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 
275. The Second Circuit later narrowly interpreted its holding in Toscanino to make clear that 
only outrageous physical brutality would defeat jurisdiction in United States ex rel. Lujan v. 
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), and United States v. Lira, 
515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). Circuit courts are split in their applica- 
tion of what has been termed the "shocking and outrageous government conduct7' exception to 
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. See generally Andrew B .  Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Juris- 
dictional Weapon in the War on Drugs, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385, 419 nn.226-27 (1990) 
(questioning vitality of Toscanino exception); Jonathan Gentin, Comment, Government-Spun- 
sored Abduction of Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero 
and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1241-43 (1991) (Supreme 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), may foreclose courts from 
relying on objective constitutional threshold to analyze government misconduct); Andrew 
Wolfenson, Note, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under Znter- 
national Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 724-38 (1989-1990) (tracing appellate court applica- 
tion of Toscanino case as exception to Ker-Frisbie doctrine). 
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The framework which prescribes the way in which courts should ap- 
proach jurisdictional problems concerning the allocation o f  governmental au- 
thority can be derived from the allocational jurisdictional concept itself. 
Jurisdiction employed in this way acts as a mechanism for channeling govern- 
ment authority into discrete and politically justifiable organizational units. 
Without it, there would be no way to accomplish effectively the intricate and 
myriad tasks necessary for governing a modern complex society.16 There 
would be no way to determine which government entity could legally exer- 
cise its power in what area and there would be no way to attach responsibility 
for an entity's failure to carry out government functions. 
To make a simple illustration, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in my home 
state of Pennsylvania could, instead of issuing driver's licenses, attempt to 
determine who had to register for military conscription, promulgate United 
States income tax regulations, mimic the role of the United Nations Security 
Council by passing decrees purporting to mandate international sanctions on 
a foreign nation, or even claim the ability to capture and try a capital of- 
fender. Other government units could do likewise. This would obviously 
make it impossible to organize global social life. By drawing upon a coherent 
organizational scheme to delineate the relative spheres of authority of the 
various government entities, and then legally mandating institutional compli- 
ance with these limits, jurisdictional law functions to channel governmental 
regulatory authority coherently. 
This concept of allocational jurisdiction would be meaningless if there 
was not a clear system that defined the distribution of power between the 
various government entities. Therefore, inherent in this jurisdictional model 
is the idea that this law and order must flow from an identifiable authority.17 
Thus, whenever differing jurisdictional laws emanating from more than one 
16. Lawyer and social theorist Max Weber explored the concept of bureaucracy in Econ- 
omy and Society, a work which, although unfinished when he died in 1920, identified and de- 
scribed the importance in modem bureaucratic society of, what I am calling, allocational 
jurisdiction. 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOL- 
OGY 954 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim 13schoff et al. trans., 1st ed. 1968). 
Weber determined that there were certain principles common to all modem governing struc- 
tures. Among these, the most basic was that of jurisdiction. According to Weber, "[r]ationally 
regulated association within a structure of domination finds its typical expression in bureaucracy 
. . . [which] is fully developed in political . . . communities only in the modem state." Id. at 956. 
Of the characteristics essential to a rationally regulated modern bureaucratic structure, the re- 
quirement of jurisdictional delineation of authority held the highest priority. Id. 
17. Id. at 956-57. Weber further states that "[tlhe principles of office hierarchy . . . stipulate 
a clearly established system . . . , and that the principle of hierarchical office authority is found in 
all bureaucratic structures." Id. at 957. See infra note 64 for further reference to this material. 
See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 24-25 (1961) (identifying need for single source of 
jurisdictional law). See generally SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 137-47, 168-83 (1979) (discussing hierarchical dispute resolution in 
state organizations). 
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legal authority could reasonably be applied to a jurisdictional issue, the au- 
thority which actually grants jurisdiction to the government entity must be 
determined and the rule of law promulgated by that authority must be 
applied. 
To address whether the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain should have 
applied the international law of jurisdiction as the legal authority, one must 
determine whether the international legal system is the proper source of the 
jurisdictional law that governs whether the United States has personal juris- 
diction over a fugitive abducted from another country without that country's 
consent. Usually, within any given domestic system there is no question 
about the jurisdictional law to be applied. For example, within the American 
federal bureaucracy the source of jurisdiction among the various government 
agencies is well-settled. It is clear, for instance, that the Food and Drug Ad- 
ministration (FDA) was granted authority pursuant to an act of Congress, the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,ls to promulgate rules regulating the 
food and drug industries in the United States. Congress itself, it has been 
established,lg was granted the authority to legislate in this area by the so- 
called Interstate Commerce Clause found in Article I, Section 8 of the 
United States C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~  
Unlike the jurisdictional law which operates solely within our domestic 
system, where the sources of jurisdictional law and the various governing 
bodies unto which they grant jurisdiction have been explicitly delineatedY2l 
the sources of authority governing the international distribution of jurisdic- 
tion have not been explicitly delineated. The source of the international ju- 
risdictional power, however, can be inferred from the paradigm upon which 
the nation-state system is based. This paradigm, as will become evident, pro- 
vides the foundation upon which jurisdictional authority is distributed be- 
tween countries. Therefore, an international jurisdictional decision, such as 
Alvarez-Machain, which is inconsistent with this paradigm, necessarily con- 
flicts with the underlying institutional reality upon which the international 
order is based. In Part IV, I demonstrate why, under this paradigm, the in- 
ternational law of jurisdiction is the source of the relevant jurisdictional grant 
of power to the United States and should, therefore, be applied to prohibit 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants abducted by the United 
18. 21 U.S.C.A. $9 301-395 (West 1994). 
19. United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947); see also United States v. Sixty-Two 
Packages, 48 F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1943) (recognizing that Congress has power under 
Commerce Clause to condemn interstate transportation of misbranded drugs), aff'd, 142 F.2d 
107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 731 (1944). 
20. The source of authority which allocates subject matter jurisdiction among the various 
courts and tribunals within the American federal government is equally well-established. See 
infra note 69. The allocation of subject matter responsibility between federal and state courts is 
also well-settled. Ann Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State 
Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1485-1538 (1987). 
21. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. See also LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS 13-27 (1989) (discussing political legitimacy and jurisdictional 
boundaries). 
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States without the consent of the abductee's state. First, however, I must 
describe the content of this jurisdictional law and explain its fundamental 
relationship to the paradigm underlying the state system. 
The international prohibition on asserting personal jurisdiction over de- 
fendants whom a foreign state has abducted without permission of the state 
where the abduction took place flows from the territorial jurisdictional limits 
on state authority inherent in the existing international system, which is 
based on territorial sovereignty. Under the classic territorial sovereignty for- 
mulation, states possess the full and complete power to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over persons or things within their own territory. This under- 
standing is inherent in the recognized definition of the "state" under interna- 
tional law: "[Aln entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or 
has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities."22 
The notion that a "defined territory and a permanent population" must 
be "under the control of its own g ~ v e r n m e n t " ~ ~  is in reality nothing more 
than a designation that statehood is the manifestation of a state's exercise of 
jurisdiction over its territorially defined populace.24 Chief Justice John Mar- 
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 201. The Restatement states that "the definition 
in this section is well-established in international law; it is nearly identical to that in Article 1 of 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933,49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19." Id. 5 201 cmt. a. 
23. Id. 5 201 (emphasis in original). The equation of statehood with coordinated control 
over a population within a defined territory is well-accepted. See, e.g., HART, supra note 17, at 
216-17 (" 'A state' is not the name of some person or thing inherently or 'by nature' outside the 
law; it is a way of referring to two facts: first, that a population inhabiting a territory lives under 
that form of ordered government provided by a legal system with its characteristic structure of 
legislature, courts, and primary rules; and, secondly, that the government enjoys a vaguely de- 
fined degree of independence."); J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law,  5 EMORY 
INT'L L. REV. 9, 99 & n.406 (1991) (citing H. DOOYEWEERD, E STRIJD OM HET SOUVEREIN- 
I T E ~ S B E G R I P  IN DE MODERNE RECHTS-EN STAATSLEER 54 (1950)) (defining the state as "the 
institutional community of a government and subjects, regulated by public law on the historical 
foundation of a monopolistic organization of the power of the sword (political authority) within 
a defined territory."); cf: HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A 
SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE 51, 98-129 (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Blanchard 
1836) ("A sovereign state is generally defined to be any nation or people, whatever may be the 
form of its internal constitution, which governs itself independently of foreign powers."). 
24. This closely accords with the common understanding of the necessary link between gov- 
ernmental control and jurisdiction. See CLYDE EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 87 
(3d ed. 1957) ("The most important right-and duty-of a state is jurisdiction. It is solidly es- 
tablished in jurisprudence. . . . From the viewpoint of sovereignty, jurisdiction means internal 
sovereignty, exclusive control over all persons and things within its territory."). Georg 
Schwarzenberger stated the principle with authoritative support: 
State sovereignty and State jurisdiction are complementary terms. Territorial sover- 
eignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e., the exclusion of the activities of other 
States, but equally fulfills a positive function: "It serves to divide between nations the 
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shall, writing in The Schooner Exchange v. M ' F a d d ~ n , ~ ~  provided what be- 
came the classic American description of this grant of jurisdictional power: 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces- 
sarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
external source, would imply a d i m i n u t i o n  o f  its s o v e r e i g n t y  to t h e  
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to 
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a 
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of 
the nation itself.26 
space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points 
the minimum of protection of which international law is the guardian." ~urthermore, 
in principle, State sovereignty and State jurisdiction are co-extensive. As the Perma- 
nent Court of Arbitration held in the case of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (1910), 
"the right to regulate the liberties conferred by the Treaty of 1818 is an attribute of 
sovereignty, and as such must be held to reside in the territorial sovereign, unless the 
contrary be provided . . . [.I One of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to 
be exercised within the territorial limits, and that, failing proof to the contrary, the 
territory is conterminous with the sovereignty." 
1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (1945) [hereinafter 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL AW] (quoting, respectively, Island of Palmas (U.S. v. 
Neth.), at 17 [2 R.I.A.A. 829, 8391 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), and North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
(U.K. v. U.S.), at 114 [Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141, 1571 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910)); see ako GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL AW AND ORDER 239 (George W. Keeton & Georg 
Schwarzenberger eds., 1971) [hereinafter SCHWARZENBERGER, LAW AND ORDER] ("In interna- 
tional law, jurisdiction is the complement of State sovereignty."). 
International tribunals have articulated the correlation between sovereignty and temtorial- 
ity. The International Court of Justice stated, "By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of 
rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, 
and also in its relations with other States." Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Apr. 
9). In Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), Max Huber wrote, 
"Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to 
a portion of the globe [territory] is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other 
State, the functions of a State." Id. at 838. 
25. I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
26. Id. at 136. Marshall's statement is perhaps the best known American articulation of the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction. The doctrine-of territoriality had, however, been previously 
described in the famous maxims formulated by Ulricus Huber (Huberus), a Dutch jurist of the 
17th century. See ULRICUS HUBER, DE C O N F L I ~  LEGUM, translated and reprinted in DAVIES, 
THE INFLUENCE OF HUBER'S DE C O N F L I ~ U  LEGUM ON ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 49 (1937). These maxims were later identified by Joseph Story as the laws which prescribed 
the territorial jurisdictional limits on governmental power. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Gen- 
eral Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241,259-62 (1965) (explaining Story's 
role in shaping the jurisdictional rules); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Con- 
flict of Laws-One-Hundred Years Afrer, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 16 & n.9, 17 (1934) (explaining 
that Huber's announcement of doctrine of territoriality preceded Story's commentaries); see also 
Ernest G.  Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict o f  Laws, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 
247, 271 n.l10 (1920). The doctrine of territorial jurisdiction has not changed significantly over 
time and remains the basis of international jurisdictional law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 9, 5 206(a) & cmt. b (describing state sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory); 
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AW 287-91 (4th ed. 1990) (same); 
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Despite the inherently territorial character of the state, many assertions 
of state authority do not lend themselves to being neatly circumscribed by 
territorial restraints. Thus, Marshall's statement merits some q~al i f icat ion.~~ 
Richard Falk has explained: 
[A]s Marshall was ready to acknowledge and to apply in Schooner 
Exchange, the fundamental spatial allocation must be modified to 
accommodate many situations of interaction between states. Not all 
events can be meaningfully located in space, and reference to the 
place where most of the constituent acts are performed often is not 
the state with the best claim of legal c o m p e t e n ~ e . ~ ~  
Falk elaborates on the ways in which international law has accommodated 
this problem: 
This has induced an expansion of the territorial allocation of legal 
competence to authorize the assertion of control over events with 
only a remote spatial contact with the claimant state. It has also 
CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL AW $5 220, 244 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (describing state's sov- 
ereignty and jurisdictional boundaries); SCHWARZENBERGER, LAW AND ORDER, supra note 24, 
ch. 5 (describing function of sovereignty in current international law); Luzius Wildhaber, Sover- 
eignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 
441 (R. MacDonald & Douglas Johnston eds., 1983) (describing concept of territorial 
jurisdiction). 
Territorial jurisdiction principles are codified as major constitutional principles of the 
United Nations organization. See, e.g., I LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL 
LAW $ 169 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (observing that "[tlhe exclusive 
dominion of a state within its territory is basic to the international system and Article 2.4 of the 
United Nations Charter accordingly requires all members to 'refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State' "). The constituent documents of regional organizations also include language guar- 
anteeing territorial jurisdiction. American states, for example, provide in Articles 9 and 12 of 
the Charter of the Organization of American States that 
[Tlhe State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its 
preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate 
concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and 
competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of 
the rights of other States in accordance with international law. . . . Jurisdiction of States 
within the limits of their national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants, 
whether nationals or aliens. 
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 9, 12, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419, 
119 U.N.T.S. 3, 54,56. Nation-states' underlying concern in maintaining international law princi- 
ples that guarantee them exclusive control over their respective territories is the desire to main- 
tain political authority. Encroachment on this exclusive authority is a direct threat to the 
"territorial integrity" of a state, similar to the unleashing of invading armies. This is because a 
regime that allows another government to assert political authority within its territory will find 
its own political authority jeopardized. 
27. This article addresses only the allocation of horizontal authority between states. In- 
creasingly, interventions by the United Nations and other international organizations supported 
by changing notions of what should be exclusively reserved for the domestic realm are vertically 
challenging the notion that states have exclusive jurisdiction over what transpires inside their 
territories. 
28. RICHARD FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC OURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OR- 
DER 30 (1964). 
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induced the formulation of supplementary principles of legal com- 
petence each of which in special contexts appears to provide a more 
persuasive defense of a jurisdictional claim than . . . could be given 
by resort to the territorial principle.29 
Falk lists the supplemental principles of jurisdiction which have gained ac- 
ceptance in varying degrees: 
[Tlhe nationality principle (the actor was a national of the claimant 
state) . . . the protective principle (the act threatened some vital 
national interest such as the security or the credit of the claimant 
state, e.g., counterfeiting its currency) . . . the passive personality 
principle (the victim of the act was a national of the claimant state), 
or . . . the universality principle (the act is so contrary to interna- 
tional order that its mere commission is enough to give legal compe- 
tence to any state that can obtain custody of the actor, e.g., 
piracy).30 
However, as Falk makes clear, Marshall's notion of exclusive territorial juris- 
diction "remains an accurate account of the major allocation of competence 
[and, most important for our purposes], especially in regard to enforcement 
aspects of legal control."31 
29. Id. at 31-32. 
30. Id. at 32. 
31. Id. at 29. Today, the concept of jurisdiction in international law has been separated for 
purposes of analytical clarity into three categories: prescriptive jurisdiction, referring to the 
power of a state to legislate or prescribe its substantive laws extraterritorially; enforcement ju- 
risdiction, referring to the power of a state to enforce its laws or perform executive acts outside 
of its territory; and adjudicative jurisdiction, referring to the power of a state to assert personal 
jurisdiction usually by way of a court exercising control over a foreign or offshore defendant so 
as to render a judgment having legal effect. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, pt. IV, 
chs. 1-3 (discussion of international jurisdiction law organized according to these distinctions); 
see also I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, 5 136 (describing concepts of jurisdiction in international 
law); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 145-212 
(1973) (same, using slightly different terminology); David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: Znterna- 
tional Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J .  INT'L L. 185, 189-90 (1984) 
(describing prescriptive jurisdiction); Bruce Zaganis & Jay Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional 
Considerations in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL. W .  INT'L L.J. 303, 316-31 (1985) (describ- 
ing international jurisdiction with respect to United States' criminal jurisdiction). 
This article only addresses adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. See infra note 40 and 
accompanying text. Because the ability to achieve legislative policy goals within national bound- 
aries is often affected by activities which occur outside of national boundaries, national legisla- 
tive schemes often prescribe activity outside national boundaries. In addition, international law 
accepts that states can generally prescribe the activities of their citizens even when in foreign 
territories. Therefore, Falk's "expansion of the territorial allocation of legal competence" and 
"supplementary principles" are most relevant to jurisdiction to prescribe laws. FALK, supra note 
28, at 31-32. Mann distinguishes between enforcement jurisdiction, which continues to be strictly 
limited by territorial principles, and prescriptive jurisdiction, which does not, as follows: 
Indeed, the fact that a State has legislative jurisdiction in respect of a crime committed 
abroad does not authorize it to send police officers into a foreign State to arrest the 
criminal and carry him across the frontier, or to send its judges into the foreign State to 
sit there as a court and try the case. There can be no question of the two jurisdictions 
coinciding. That a State which has legislative jurisdiction may apply and enforce it in its 
own territory is undoubted and involves no problem. Enforcement jurisdiction, how- 
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Because police operations and, in particular, the capture of criminal sus- 
pects naturally occur within a clearly defined territory, such operations serve 
as classic examples of state activities over which the allocation of jurisdic- 
tional control continues to be governed exclusively by territorial  principle^.^^ 
For this reason, the international jurisdictional law addressing the allocation 
of authority between states as it relates to state jurisdiction over criminal 
defendants is well-defined.33 Stemming from states' exclusive territorial sov- 
ereignty, they may, under the general principles of international law, at their 
discretion, extradite,34 grant asylum,35 or exercise authority in some other 
ever, is concerned with putting a State's legislative jurisdiction into effect in another 
country. As a matter of firm principle this cannot be done without the consent of the 
State in which the act of enforcement takes place. The rights of the territorial sover- 
eign prevail. The international order would be gravely prejudiced if it were other- 
- - 
wise. . . . [Therefore,] a conviction obtained in such circumstances would, it is 
submitted, itself be unlawful. 
F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Law Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 
37, 39 (1984). 
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
34. "Extradition" is defined as the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a 
crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or punishment. 
RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, pt. IV, ch. 7, introductory note, at 556-57. Extradition, 
which often occurs pursuant to the obligatory provisions of a bilateral extradition treaty, is a 
legal procedure that tends to be more procedurally cumbersome than either deportation or ex- 
clusion of an international fugitive. See infra note 39. 
International law does not require states to surrender fugitives in the absence of a treaty 
creating the obligation. Judge Bedjaoui recently reaffirmed the principle specifically as it applies 
to a stite3s own citizenry in-his opinion in Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Ap-  
plication of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, which 
arose from the bombing of the PanAmerican airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland and was recently 
argued before the International Court of Justice: "Without entering into the merits of the case, I 
would point out that, as is well known, there does not exist in international law any rule that 
prohibits, or, on the contrary, imposes the extradition of nationals." Case Concerning Questions 
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 'A 12 (Apr. 14) 
(Bedjaoui, J., dissenting). The doctrine is authoritatively established. See, e.g., I OPPENHEIM, 
supra note 26, 5 415; 6 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. XVI, 5 3 
(1968); IV JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 580 (1906). There was a 
contrasting historical minority rule, but that is no longer applicable today. See I1 HUGO GRO- 
TIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS '1(¶ 527-28 (1625), translated in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Scott ed. 1913) (understanding extradition to be a duty imposed by international law 
under some circumstances). 
In addition to fulfilling the allocational jurisdictional function of allowing states to secure 
the return of wanted fugitives, which is consistent with the principles of territorial sovereignty, 
see supra note 26 and accompanying text, some states have chosen to build into extradition 
treaties and corresponding domestic legislation protections for the rights of defendants. "The 
law of extradition as reflected in treaties and statutes . . . balances the demands of the interna- 
tional legal order that serious crime not go unpunished with concern that persons accused of 
crime not be subjected to unfair methods o f  adjudication or RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 9, 5 476 cmt. a (citations omitted). See generally id. at pt. IV, ch. 7, sub- 
chapter B (describing United States law on extradition); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 560-75 (1974) (discussing traditional law of extradi- 
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manner over fugitives who are present within their territory and wanted by 
foreign states. 
As a logical extension of this law, states may not ascertain jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants by abducting them. The obvious complement to the 
full and complete sovereignty that each state has within its own territory is 
that these same states cannot exercise administrative powers in foreign states 
and, specifically, cannot arrest fugitives within those foreign states without 
the states' p e r m i ~ s i o n . ~ ~  Such prohibitions may frustrate the ability for states 
tion and suggesting "World Public Order" model of extradition); IVAN A. SHEARER, EX-I-RADI- 
TION IN INTERNATIONAL AW passim (1971) (describing law of extradition); Research in 
International Law Drafr Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J .  INT'L L. 15, 21-240 (Supp. 1935) 
(containing draft convention on extradition with bibliography and commentary). 
35. "Asylum" refers to a state granting safe-haven to individuals who are wanted by foreign 
authorities by admitting them to and later allowing their continued presence within state bor- 
ders. States' competence to grant asylum is authoritatively established as derivative of territorial 
sovereignty. 
The fact that every state exercises territorial supremacy over all persons on its temtory, 
whether they are its nationals or aliens, excludes the exercise of the power of foreign 
states over [their own] nationals in the territory of another state. Thus, a foreign state 
is, provisionally at least, an asylum for every individual who, being prosecuted at home, 
crosses its frontier. . . . [Sltates have always upheld their competence to grant asylum, if 
they choose to do so. 
I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, 5 402. The weight of scholarly opinion has traditionally supported 
this principle. See HYDE, supra note 26, 5 310 (describing right of state to grant asylum to those 
in its territory); I JOHN B. MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 9 9 (1891) 
(same); I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, 5 402 n.2 (listing informative sources on the right of asylum 
generally); WHEATON, supra note 23, at 211 (describing right of state to grant asylum generally). 
36. The uncontroverted rule is: 
It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state 
may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's 
consent. Thus, while a state may take certain measures of nonjudicial enforcement 
against a person in another state . . . , its law enforcement officers cannot arrest him in 
another state, and can engage in criminal investigation in that state only with that 
state's consent. 
RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, 5 432 cmt. b. In addition, international principles defining 
the limits of judicial assistance likewise provide that "[tlhe underlying principle of international 
law . . . is that a state may not conduct official activities in the territory of another state without 
that state's consent, express or implied." Id. ch. 7, subchapter A, introductory note, at 526. This 
rule of international law is a logical extension of the principle of territorial sovereignty: "When 
done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a 
. . . blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state . . . ." Louis Henkin, A Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J .  MARSHALL . REV. 215, 231 (1992), cited in United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188,2202 n.24 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writings of 
other commentators similarly reflect the understanding that the international rule banning kid- 
napping flows directly from the concept of territorial sovereignty: The territorial principle "re- 
flects one aspect of the sovereignty exercisable by a state in its territorial home, and is the 
indispensable foundation for the application of the series of legal rights that a state possesses." 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (3d ed. 1991); accord HYDE, supra note 26, 
8 321, at 1031-32; F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach o f  
International Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
SHABATI ROSENNE 407 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tobory eds., 1989); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Un- 
lawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J .  TRANS- 
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to prosecute defendants because, contrary to civil cases,37 in criminal cases in 
the United States and many other countries, defendants must be physically 
brought before the court. This is thought necessary to secure the defendants' 
right to notice of the proceedings against them, the right to defend them- 
selves, and the right to confront their accusers.38 
If a defendant can be arrested within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
prosecuting state, there is, of course, no violation of the international law of 
territorial jurisdiction. However, if the defendant is residing in a foreign 
NAT'L L. 25, 28 (1973); Michael H. Cardozo, Note, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the 
Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 132 (1961); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a 
State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 
IND. L.J. 427, 428-29 (1957); Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defend- 
ant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. &v. 91,92-93 (1953); Kathryn 
Selleck, Comment, Jurisdiction Afrer International Kidnapping: A Comparative Study, 8 B.C. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 237 (1985). 
37. Courts can assert jurisdiction over civil defendants even if they never appear before the 
court by providing proper notice of the proceedings against them. Without the need for a physi- 
cal incursion by United States law enforcement agents into the foreign state where the defendant 
is resident to capture illegally the defendant, the assertion of civil jurisdiction over an offshore 
defendant does not violate the exclusive jurisdiction of foreign states to exercise law enforce- 
ment activities within its own territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, $ 478 cmt. e; LEA 
BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN m AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 330 
(1986) (explaining possible reasons for different requirements for civil and criminal jurisdiction). 
I argue elsewhere that, in civil cases involving foreign (as opposed to offshore) plaintiffs or 
defendants, international rather than domestic jurisdictional law should be applied by domestic 
courts. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1995). Because tem- 
torial sovereignty, which I demonstrate in this article to be internationally prescribed, is not 
violated in civil cases, that article more comprehensively explores the nature of the existing allo- 
cation of prescriptive authority between the domestic and international orders. Based on this 
exploration, the article concludes that the state cannot self-prescribe its own law of civil jurisdic- 
tion. Id. 
38. In the United States, for example, the presence of the criminal defendant is constitu- 
tionally required pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation which states, in perti- 
nent part, that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. More specifically, the ac- 
cused's physical presence is constitutionally required to initiate prosecution, although a trial in 
progress may in limited circumstances proceed without the presence of the criminal defendant. 
E.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372-73 (1892) (common law secures criminal defend- 
ant's right to be present for duration of trial); accord Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1015-20 (1988) 
(reaffirming importance of confrontation right constitutionally provided to criminal defendant); 
United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) ("The constitutional right to presence is 
rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . .") (citing 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (addressing effect of defendant's disruptive conduct during 
trial proceedings on confrontation right)); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (as- 
serting that Sixth Amendment constitutional right to be heard requires criminal defendant's 
presence at trial); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (recognizing valid 
waiver of defendant's right to confrontation pursuant to accused's voluntary absence after com- 
mencement of proceeding in non-capital case); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08 
(1934) (holding Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process requires defendant's presence 
only to extent necessary to ensure fair trial), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964). 
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state, "informal r e n d i t i ~ n , " ~ ~  extradition, or physical abduction are the only 
means of securing the defendant's physical presence in the prosecuting state. 
When a state secures the requisite physical presence of a defendant by 
disregarding the jurisdictional requirements of international law, the state 
does not have personal jurisdiction to try the defendant despite the defend- 
ant's presence. Comment c to section 432 of the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States states the generally accepted rule 
relating the prohibition on illegal abductions to the prohibition on assertions 
of jurisdiction: 
If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the 
territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is 
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation 
from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduc- 
tion of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may 
demand return of the person, and international law requires that he 
be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does 
not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting 
state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws.40 
39. "Informal" renditions may allow nation-states to secure the return of fugitives without 
involving the formal procedures of extradition. See generally RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra 
note 9, 9 475 reporters' note 6, 5 478 reporters' note 6 (discussing deportation as alternative to 
extradition). See also Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1969); Stevenson v. 
United States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1967); R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte 
Soblen [I9631 1 Q.B. 829, [I9631 2 Q.B. 243. Exclusion and deportation comprise the two most 
common methods of informal rendition, both of which require a unilateral act by the asylum 
state that may result in the return of the alien fugitive to the state wanting him for prosecution. 
"Exclusion" refers to the asylum state's practice of denying admission to its territory based on 
grounds of, for example, lack of proper documentation, suspicious behavior, or physical or 
mental affliction. See Alona E. Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the International Fugitive 
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT. Y . B .  INT'L L. 
77, 82-83 (1964) (defining what exclusion entails under United States law). Once the fugitive has 
entered the asylum state's territory, the asylum government must issue an administrative order 
directing the foreigner to leave the country through deportation processes. Under deportation 
or expulsion (the terms are used interchangeably), the fugitive is generally provided the means 
to leave the country voluntarily, a choice of destination states from limited options, and may be 
permitted to plead threat of physical persecution if returned to the state of his departure. Id. at 
84-85. 
A state's unilateral ability to deport or exclude aliens has been historically established in 
accordance with the territoriality principle of state power. For example, the Supreme Court 
held, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), that the powers of exclusion and 
expulsion are inherent in sovereignty as "an accepted maxim of international law." Nishirnura, 
142 U.S. at 659. 
40. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, § 432 cmt. c. The overwhelming weight of distin- 
guished commentary confirms the existence of a rule of international law denying states personal 
jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign states without the consent of such states. For 
example, Lassa Oppenheim states: 
It is . . . a breach of international law for a state without permission to send its agents 
into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a 
crime. Where this has happened, the bffending state should-and often does-hand 
over the person in question to the state in whose territory he was apprehended. 
JURISDICTIONAL NIHILISM 
I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, 5 119, at 388 (footnotes omitted); accord T. WALKER, A MANUAL 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1895) (no state may exercise jurisdiction over persons or 
property in territory of another state); Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or 
Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, passim (1934) (national court 
not competent to subject person to local law if seizure or arrest made in violation of interna- 
tional law); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International 
Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265, 266 (1952) (discussing whether local jurisdiction can be 
founded on violation of international law); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Ex- 
tradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1960) (one state may not perform acts of sovereignty 
over another state); Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over 
Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L . 513, 576 (1992) (when nation in which abduction occurred protests, 
subsequent prosecution violates international law); Catherine Fisher, U.S. Legislation to Prose- 
cute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 933-36 
(1985) (discussing limitations on state's authority to apply its laws in conflict with other state's 
interests); Gentin, supra note 15, at 1263 (violation of extradition treaty extinguishes U.S. court 
jurisdiction). 
State practice is consistent with the rule prohibiting the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
following an unpermitted, state-sponsored abduction. See I MOORE, supra note 35, ch. VII, 
$5 188-99, at 281-93 (canvassing early United States cases involving state-sponsored abductions); 
4 MOORE, supra note 34, 603, at 328-32 (same). While individual instances of state practice 
demonstrating the principle are too numerous to mention, some of the more well-known cases 
include: Ex parte Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. R. 24, 33 (1981) (international jurisdictional rule of 
law precluded jurisdiction); Regina v. Hartley, 2 N.Z.L.R. 199, 217 (C.A. 1978) (adherence to 
international jurisdictional rule of law precluded jurisdiction); Affaire Mantovani, Italie et 
Suisse, cited in Charles Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Znternationaux, 69 REVUE GENERALE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 761, 834-35 (1965) (Italian police apologized for violation of 
Switzerland's territorial sovereignty after Italian police officials failed attempt to arrest and re- 
turn to Italy an Italian national in Switzerland); The Schnaebele Case, described in I11 TRAVERS, 
LE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL NO. 1302 (Paris 1924) (German government returned French 
police official to France after French government protested acts of German officials luring de- 
fendant into Germany); Casablanca Case (Fr. v. Germ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 110 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1916) (referring to deserters from French Foreign Legion seized by France in Germany); 
Case of Nollet, as digested in 18 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1188, 1189 (Cour d'appel 
de Douai 1891) (integrity of sovereignty asylum state precluded jurisdiction); see also Lawrence 
Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 502, 502-04 
(1935) (describing The Jacob-Salomon Case in which Germany ultimately conceded to return 
Swiss citizen kidnapped in Switzerland after Swiss government diplomatically protested); Law- 
rence Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany), 30 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 123, 124 n.6 (1936) (describing The Blair Case (1876), in which English government returned 
English citizen to United States after United States government protested); Selleck, supra note 
36, at 260 (discussing In re Jolis, 11933-19341 Ann. Dig. 191 (Tribunal Correctional d'Avesnes), in 
which court held arrest of Belgian by French was "a nullity" because Belgian government offi- 
cially protested to French government). 
Consistent with the concept of sovereignty, states can assert jurisdiction if the foreign state 
does not object. The international rule on abductions referred to as the doctrine of "male captus, 
bene detentus" incorporates this exception which allows for jurisdiction. "Nearly all states have 
followed the rule that, absent protest from other states, they will try persons brought before their 
courts through irregular means, even through an abduction from another state in violation of 
international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 432 reporters' note 2 (emphasis ad- 
ded). Influential commentary has, however, called for strengthening the international rule by 
requiring explicit consent to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the abducting country. See 
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 
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Having described the concept of state sovereignty and its relationship to 
international jurisdictional law as prohibiting the assertion of state jurisdic- 
tion over defendants abducted from foreign states without the consent of 
those states, I can now explain why this law is the source of the jurisdictional 
grant that should be applied in American courts. 
IV. THE LEGAL SOURCE THAT GRANTS J U R I S D I ~ I O N  
TO THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Alvarez-Machain Court's Mistaken Belief that the United States 
Constitution Is the Source of Jurisdictional Law To Be Applied to 
Foreign Abductees by Domestic Courts 
The framework prescribing the proper method of applying jurisdictional 
law makes clear the tautology that once any component within an organiza- 
tional structure identifies the source of its jurisdictional authority to act, the 
jurisdictional rules promulgated by that source must be followed. I will 
demonstrate in Section B which follows that the just discussed international 
law of jurisdiction is the proper source granting the United States the author- 
ity to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants when questions arise con- 
cerning the international allocation of jurisdictional authority. The Alvarez- 
Machain Court, however, believes to the contrary that the United States 
Constitution is that source.41 The fact that the Court believes the Constitu- 
tion to be this source of jurisdictional authority is evidenced by the Court's 
reliance upon Frisbie v. Collins,42 one of the two major pre-Alvarez-Machain 
abduction decisions. Frisbie implicitly held that United States constitutional 
law allows for jurisdiction in abduction cases. 
Frisbie, unlike the other case which the Court discussed, Ker v. Z l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~  
was not an international case. Rather, the defendant in Frisbie was kid- 
napped in Illinois by Michigan officials and brought before a Michigan state 
The Supreme Court, as it had in Ker, looked to the United States 
Constitution to ascertain whether the Constitution protected the defendant 
435, 442 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Research in International Law] (Article 16). Article 16 
provided: 
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any 
person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by 
recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention with- 
out first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by 
such measures. 
Id.; see also Andreas F .  Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment: Still More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J .  
INT'L L. 655, 661 (1991) (silence should not be construed as consent); cf. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J .  
INT'L L. 444, 489 (1990) (citing need for international law principles to safeguard rights of 
accused). 
41. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992). 
42. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
43. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text for a detailed dis- 
cussion of Ker. 
44. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520. 
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from the k i d n a ~ p i n g . ~ ~  Concluding that the Constitution did not protect the 
defendant,46 the Court neglected to consider the possibility that the protec- 
tion of the territorial sovereignty of Illinois may be a basis for restricting the 
Michigan court's assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant. The Frisbie 
Court may have incorrectly and quite illogically concluded that although the 
international law of jurisdiction did distribute authority within the United 
States, that law should nonetheless be ignored. This would have been rather 
unlikely, however, given international law's unambiguous prohibition on ex- 
traterritorial assertions of personal juri~dict ion.~~ More likely, the Frisbie 
Court correctly assumed that the allocation of authority between states 
within the United States should be distributed in accordance with the United 
States Constitution and not international law.48 If so, the Court effectively 
held that the United States, at the time of the decision in 1952, was integrated 
to a sufficient extent that, unlike the international law protecting the territo- 
rial sovereignty of nation-states, the constitutional protections of the sover- 
eignty of the fifty United States no longer meant that one state's 
unauthorized arrest of a defendant in another state precluded the first state's 
jurisdiction. By relying on Frisbie as precedent, and subsequently failing to 
distinguish the constitutional basis for its intra-United States territorial or 
lack of territorial divisions, the Alvarez-Machain Court is indicating that it 
does not see a distinction between abductions among the fifty states of the 
Union and abductions among the nation-states of the international order. 
Thus, the Court likely assumes that the United States Constitution applies to 
international abduction cases.49 
45. Id. at 522. 
46. The Frisbie Court proclaimed: 
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker] that the power of a 
court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought 
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction.' No persuasive reasons 
are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis 
that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after 
having been fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against him and after a fair trial in 
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitu- 
tion that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice 
because he was brought to trial against his will. 
Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522, quoted in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 
(1992). 
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
48. International law is not intended to allocate jurisdiction between states within the 
United States. "International law addresses the exercise of jurisdiction by a state; it does not 
concern itself with the allocation of jurisdiction among domestic courts within a state for exam- 
ple, between national and local courts in a federal system." RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 
9, 9 421 cmt. f; cf: infra notes 62-95 and accompanying text (discussing international law's role as 
allocating jurisdiction between nation-states). 
49. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192-93. For an example of a lower court case that failed 
to distinguish properly between the constitutional issues in Ker and the international issues in 
Frisbie, see United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68,73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); see 
also id. at 72-73 (Oakes, J., concurring) (referring to "abstract doctrine Ker and Frisbie are said 
to stand for" as a matter of United States constitutional law) (citations omitted). 
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In addition, a belief that the Constitution is the ultimate source of the 
grant of personal jurisdiction to the United States would provide an explana- 
tion for the Court's distinction that the bilateral extradition treaty, if found to 
ban kidnapping, should have been applied to deny jurisdiction while the pro- 
hibition under international jurisdictional law should not have been ap- 
plied.50 The United States-Mexico extradition treaty51 is a self-executing 
treaty that was ratified by the United States Senate and is therefore regarded 
within the American legal scheme as applicable but subordinate in authority 
to the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~  Under this hierarchy of authority the treaty could be 
considered the functional equivalent of a long-arm statute.53 As long as the 
United States Constitution grants jurisdiction, and the legislative intent mani- 
fest in the treaty does not prohibit the ability of the United States to exercise 
the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction, then the assertion of jurisdiction 
should be allowed. However, because the international law of jurisdiction is 
not thought to be the basic source granting jurisdiction, and it clearly does 
not perform the role of a long arm statute, which states prescribe themselves 
to limit their own jurisdiction, it has no role in this domestic scheme.54 
Further evidence that the Alvarez-Machain Court believed the Constitu- 
tion to be the definitive source that grants personal jurisdiction to the United 
50. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193, 2196. 
51. Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059 
(T.I.A.S. No. 9656). 
52. "By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, 
with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the 
land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other." Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888); accord Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) 
(stating the proposition that when treaty is self-executing, court may look "to the treaty for a 
rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
253, 314 (1829) ("[Olur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is conse- 
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it 
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision."). 
53. "Long arm statute" refers to legislation fashioned by a forum's government to limit the 
jurisdictional reach of its own forum courts. For example, although the United States Constitu- 
tion prescribes mandatory constraints on jurisdiction, the federal and state legislatures can create 
long arm statutes that function to further limit the jurisdictional reach of their respective forums 
beyond those constitutional requirements. For further definition, see BLACK'S LAW DICTION- 
ARY 942 (6th ed. 1990). 
54. Otherwise, it is difficult to ascertain from the decision the theoretical rationale behind 
the Court's distinction between general principles of international law as inapplicable and treaty 
law as applicable. Based on the traditional doctrine under which the rules of international law 
are applied in American courts, this is an unusual distinction. This doctrine establishes that 
international law is a part of the law of the United States and should be applied by American 
courts when appropriate. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is 
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi- 
nation."). As such, there is no basis for distinguishing between self-executing treaties and other 
general international legal rules. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. This is qualified by 
some commentators who believe that if the two are in conflict, the treaty should take precedence 
over general international legal rules. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, $ 115 cmt. d, re- 
porters' note 4. 
19941 J U R I S D I C T I O N A L  N I H I L I S M  1229 
States is that, when the Court analogously attempts to assert jurisdiction in 
civil cases, it appears to believe that the jurisdiction of the United States as a 
whole emanates from the Constitution rather than international law.55 For 
example, the Court has looked to the United States Constitution when defin- 
ing the personal jurisdictional reach of the federal courts which, as opposed 
to state courts, are agents of the whole of the American sovereign.56 
Recognizing the national character of federal courts, some commenta- 
tors have argued for a "national contacts" test,57 and in certain circumstances 
55. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (Due Pro- 
cess Clause prevents state court from exercising personal jurisdiction in a manner violating no- 
tions of fair play); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984) 
(petitioner's contacts were insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements of Due Process 
Clause); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982) (personal jurisdiction flows from Due Process Clause); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min- 
ing Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (Due Process Clause permitted state to take or decline in 
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporation). 
I explore elsewhere the question of whether the Supreme Court, other courts, and commen- 
tators are correct in assuming that the Constitution is the source which grants jurisdiction to the 
United States in civil cases involving foreign parties. This question suggests related, though dif- 
ferent, problems from those which are explored in this article. See Strauss, supra note 37. On 
the one hand, the attempt to assert jurisdiction over criminal defendants can lead, for reasons 
unique to criminal jurisdiction, to a potential conflict with the allocation of territorial jurisdiction 
between sovereign states. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. On the other hand, juris- 
diction over civil defendants may be defeated, for reasons unique to civil jurisdiction, if a suffi- 
cient nexus between the defendant and the forum, based on factors other than strict 
territoriality, is not established. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Despite these differ- 
ences, the fact that the Supreme Court is accustomed to looking to the Constitution as the 
proper source of the law of jurisdiction in civil cases indicates it is probably doing likewise in 
Alvarez-Machain. 
56. See, e.g., Ireland, 456 U.S. at 701-05 (assuming United States Constitution prescribes 
scope of adjudicatory jurisdictional law to be applied when federal courts attempt to assert juris- 
diction over foreign defendants). 
57. E.g., Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J .  
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 37, 43 (1987) (proposing heightened constitutional scrutiny of jurisdictional 
claims in international cases and stating that national contacts test would be closer to practice of 
other nations than current due process analysis); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic 
and Alien Defendants, 69 V A .  L. REV. 85, 151 (1983) (analyzing limitations on personal jurisdic- 
tion in suits involving aliens and examining utility of national contacts doctrine in both federal 
and state court assertions of personal jurisdiction); Irene D. Sann, Personal Jurisdiction in Fed- 
eral Question Suits: Toward a Unified and Rational Theory for Personal Jurisdiction over Non- 
Domiciliary and Alien Defendants, 16 PAC. L.J. 1, 232-33 (1984) (arguing that national contacts 
standard in federal questions cases would be rationally related directly to United States as "the 
sovereign that is seeking to assert jurisdiction," and that such a standard would promote uni- 
formity of analysis among federal courts); Pamela J. Stephens, The Federal Court Across the 
Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH L. 
REV. 697 (1984) (exploring history of personal jurisdiction doctrine and arguing for congres- 
sional adoption of a national contacts test based on reasonableness standard); Yvonne L. Blau- 
velt, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 853,874 (1988) (noting that Supreme Court in Asahi ignored oppor- 
tunity to provide federal standard of personal jurisdiction in international cases and arguing that 
a "foreign defendant's contacts should be with the United States as a whole rather than with a 
particular, individual state"); Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a Basis for In 
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when deciding whether to allow federal assertions of personal jurisdiction in 
civil cases, such a test has been applied.58 Though operating under the as- 
sumption that the United States is the relevant jurisdictional entity, courts do 
not apply international law to determine the civil defendant's contacts with 
the United States when applying the national contacts test. They instead ap- 
ply the minimum contacts analysis derived from the United States 
Con~t i tu t ion .~~  
Finally, in civil procedure, the argument that assertions of personal juris- 
diction by the United States emanate from the Constitution and not interna- 
Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question Suites, 70 CA. L. REV. 686, 707 (1982) 
(arguing that "federal courts should be permitted to aggregate the national contacts of alien 
defendants to determine in personam jurisdiction in federal question suits"); Bradley W. Paul- 
son, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens: Unravelling Entangled Case Law, 13 H o u s .  J .  
INT'L L. 117, 146 (1990) (reviewing incongruous approaches to personal jurisdiction and sug- 
gesting that national contacts test would be most appropriate in federal court assertions of per- 
sonal jurisdiction); cf. Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Federal Caurts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 85 (1984) (exploring arguments support- 
ing proposition that federal courts can assert personal jurisdiction over all defendants having 
minimum contacts with United States, and addressing implications of national contacts test on 
application by courts of current personal jurisdiction statutes). 
58. In federal question cases, the courts look to the service-of-process provisions, if they 
exist within the applicable substantive federal legislation to be applied, for an indication of how 
widely to construe the extent to which they should assert personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(e). Provisions have been interpreted to provide that contacts with the United States as a 
whole (national contacts), rather than with any of the fifty states, are sufficient to establish the 
personal jurisdiction of the federal forum. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 5 (1994); Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 22 (1976) (same); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78aa (1976) 
(same). If such provisions do not exist, or in diversity cases, courts have read various provisions 
of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require that their jurisdiction is determined 
by the long arm statute of the state in which they sit. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). The rule was recently 
amended, however, to provide that in federal question cases, for which there is no applicable 
long arm statute, if a foreign defendant does not have contacts with any individual state suffi- 
cient for the exercise of jurisdiction under the state's own long arm statute, but does have con- 
tacts with the United States as a whole sufficient to establish the requisite "national contacts" 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, any federal-court can assert personal 
jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
59. See, e.g., FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251,256 (5th Cir. 1981) (standing for propo- 
sition that, subject only to regulation of Congress, each federal court exercises judicial power of 
United States, which is not constitutionally limited by boundaries of particular district, and "due 
process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit have minimum contact with the United 
States, 'the sovereign that has created the court' ") (citing Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); accord Askanase v. Fatjo, Civ.A.No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 
208682, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22,1993) (concluding that bankruptcy laws provide personal juris- 
diction anywhere in United States as sovereign authority on federal questions). 
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of the national contacts test. 
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court did mention the 
issue: 
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdic- 
tion over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on 
the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits. 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.* (emphasis in original). 
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tional law tends to explain why the Supreme Court, when applying the 
conventional minimum contacts test to restrict the assertion of jurisdiction 
over alien defendants by states within the United States, is only concerned 
with whether the individual states have jurisdiction and not with whether the 
United States as a whole has jur isdi~t ion.~~ If under the Constitution one of 
the fifty states within the United States may assert personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant, then that same document would not logically circumscribe the 
jurisdiction of the more encompassing national entity more narrowly. The 
Court's failure to consider the jurisdictional relevance of the United States as 
a whole, therefore, indicates its implicit understanding that the Constitution 
provides the jurisdictional grant of power to the United States. 
While implicit rather than explicit, the evidence is persuasive that the 
Alvarez-Machain Court based its decision on the belief that the Constitution, 
rather than international law, is the source that grants jurisdiction to the 
United States.61 
60. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (denying California jurisdiction over Japanese parts 
supplier); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (denying Texas 
jurisdiction over Columbian corporation); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 
439 (1952) (permitting Ohio jurisdiction over Philippine mining corporation). In none of these 
cases did the Court question whether the United States as a whole had jurisdiction. 
61. There is, however, a possible alternative basis for the Court's disregard of international 
law. The Court may believe that the grant of territorial jurisdiction to countries comes from 
international law, but that the jurisdictional law relevant to the Court's own ability to assert 
personal jurisdiction comes from the Constitution. 
The Court could have arrived at this conclusion, that the jurisdiction of courts as distinct 
from the state is governed by the Constitution by assuming that, in accordance with the territo- 
rial approach to jurisdiction, the Constitution should prescribe assertions of jurisdiction by 
American courts located within American territory. If the Court has made the assumption, it 
has invented a false distinction between the personal jurisdiction of the state and the personal 
jurisdiction of the courts. Because personal jurisdiction is concerned not with courts, but with 
the allocation of authority between states of the union within our federal system, or nation-state 
within the international system, it concerns the forum state's authority to exercise regulatory 
control over the defendant. While the discourse surrounding personal jurisdiction has developed 
to sometimes interchangeably refer to "the jurisdiction of the court" and "the jurisdiction of the 
forum," the jurisdiction of the court is only at issue to the extent that the court is the particular 
institution of the forum state called upon to act on the state's behalf. If a state has personal 
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant, it can dispose of the case in any manner it desires. It 
could send the case to any of its courts or even subject the defendant to extra-judicial process. 
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7 cmt. a, at 41 (1942). ("Although a state has jurisdiction 
over the person of the defendant, it may not have given to a particular court or it may not have 
given to any of its courts power to entertain the action. In such a case the court has no 'compe- 
tency' to render a valid judgment."). 
While other issues of international human rights might be impacted, the authority of the 
forum to exercise personal jurisdiction based on the territorial concern with the allocation of 
authority between states would remain unaffected. Because the distinction between the personal 
jurisdiction of the state and that of the court is a false one, what is really at issue is not the 
question of whether the court has jurisdiction or the state has jurisdiction, but whether the courts 
are to apply the applicable jurisdictional law if it is the international law of jurisdiction. 
If the Court has in fact confused the jurisdiction of the state with the jurisdiction of the 
Court, it would not be the first to do so. Although Ex parte Lopez, 6 F .  Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 
1934), is distinguishable from Alvarez-Machain, see infra note 112, as jurisdiction in Lopez is 
1232 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
B. International Jurisdictional Law as the Source o f  the States' Jurisdictional 
Law To Be Applied in United States Courts 
The central premise of this article is that international jurisdictional law, 
and not the United States Constitution, is the proper source that grants juris- 
diction to the United States. When concerned with the allocation of territo- 
rial jurisdiction between sovereigns, international law and the Constitution 
are both coherently fashioned from the common paradigm underlying the 
state system.62 Implicit in this paradigm is the idea that the distribution of 
power between nations emanates from international law and the distribution 
of power between entities within nations emanates from domestic law. Only 
when seen in this light does each type of jurisdictional law, within the global 
system of jurisdiction, perform a coherent symmetrical function. Interna- 
tional law allocates authority between nation-states. The United States Con- 
stitution, as an internal document of the United States, allocates authority 
among the fifty states.63 Contrary to this premise, Alvarez-Machain implies 
that the domestic laws of the various nations redundantly attempt to allocate 
the international distribution of authority unilaterally, while leaving the 
clearly existing international law of jurisdiction no role to play. To accept 
that this paradigm applies internationally is only to presume that the basic 
organizational theory axiom-that institutional coherence demands that 
structures and rules necessary for allocating authority between units of coe- 
arguably legal under international law, the Lopez court appears to distinguish between the juris- 
diction of the court and the jurisdiction of the state: "The intervention of the government of 
Mexico raises serious questions, involving the claimed violation of its sovereignty, which may 
well be presented to the Executive Department of the United States, but of which this court has 
no jurisdiction." Lopez,  6 F. Supp. at 344; see also Andrew B. Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doc- 
trine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on Drugs, 23 VAND. J .  TRANSNAT'L . 385, 407-22 
(1990) (reviewing case law suggesting power of government to seize foreign citizens separate 
from jurisdiction of court); D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the 
United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 T E X .  INT'L L.J. 1, 39-49 (1988) 
(differentiating between jurisdiction of United States government and its courts); Malvina 
Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 
736, 744-45 (1992) (analyzing acts of United States government separate from jurisdiction of 
court); Peter McCarthy, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Extending the Ker-Fris- 
bie Doctrine To Meet the Modern Challenges Posed by the International Drug Trade, 27 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1067, 1076-92 (1993) (discussing rights of United States under extradition treaty as 
separate from jurisdiction of court); Darin Bifani, Comment, The Tension Between Policy Objec- 
tives and Individual Rights: Rethinking Extradition and Extraterritorial Abduction Jurisprudence, 
41 BUFF. L. REV. 627,678-95 (1993) (treating jurisdiction of court separate from right of govern- 
ment to seize defendants); William Birkett, Comment, Cracks in the Foundation of Extraterrito- 
rial Law Enforcement-A Challenge to Basic Judicial Doctrines, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 599, 621-22 
(1991) (suggesting courts should divest themselves of jurisdiction over abducted individuals to 
prevent government transgressions). 
62. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of this paradigm. 
63. In addition, the Constitution could act as a supplemental long-arm-like self-limit on the 
jurisdiction of the United States beyond that called for by international law. See supra note 53 
for a definition of "long arm statute." 
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qua1 status be developed at a level which transcends that of any individual 
unit-applies to the international order.64 
Specific evidence that international law is the source of a state's jurisdic- 
tion is found in the formulation of the international jurisdictional law regard- 
ing abductions in particular. The explicit requirement that an illegally 
abducted defendant be returned to the state of capture65 implies that it is not 
only illegal for a foreign state to abduct a defendant from another state 
(which could be remedied by any one of a variety of international sanc- 
t i o n ~ ~ ~ ) ,  but also that the abducting state does not have jurisdiction to exer- 
cise authority over the defendant. 
Written by drafters who implicitly assumed the paradigm, the United 
States Constitution implies a similar unde r~ t and ing .~~  As a document 
designed to provide a framework for the internal governance of the United 
States and not the global community, the Constitution does not purport to 
allocate power among the nation-states of the global community, but only 
among the fifty states of the Union and between those fifty states and the 
64. Max Weber gives one of the classic descriptions of this axiom: 
The principles of of ice  hierarchy and of channels of appeal . . . stipulate a clearly 
established system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the 
lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of 
appealing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to  the corre- 
sponding superior authority. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the 
office hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principle of hierarchical office au- 
thority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as 
well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the 
character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called "private" or  "public." 
When the principle of jurisdictional "competency" is fully carried through, hierar- 
chical subordination-at least in public office-does not mean that the "higher" au- 
thority is authorized simply to take over the business of the "lower." Indeed, the 
opposite is the rule; once an office has been set up, a new incumbent will always be 
appointed if a vacancy occurs. 
3 MAX WEBER, supra note 16, at 957 (emphasis in original); see also MOORE, A M A  MANAGE- 
MENT HANDBOOK § 1 (1970) (emphasizing that establishing hierarchy of "authority, power, deci- 
sion making and administering" is essential to achievement of organizational goals; asserting 
that, whether delegation of authority results in decentralized or  centralized formal structure, 
central source for guidance and authority is required for "organizational coherence and to avoid 
organizational chaos"); PETER DRUCKER, THE CONCEIT OF THE ORGANIZATION 30-54 (1946) 
(maintaining that central authority, which defines delegation of power and corresponding role of 
constituent units in any centralized or decentralized organizational structure, is vital to  adminis- 
trative efficiency and to long-term survival of institution). 
65. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
66. For example, possibilities could include formal censure through resolutions of interna- 
tional organizations or  limited economic sanctions. 
67. One legal scholar, emphasizing that the framers of the Constitution were extremely 
well-schooled in international law, has described the Constitution as a charter of authority, allo- 
cating jurisdiction between the different branches of the distinct national and state authorities in 
order to achieve, in part, the essential constitutional objective of paving a "way to  nationhood- 
'one nation firmly hooped together' with respect to  everything external." Edwin D. Dickinson, 
The Law of Nations as Part o f  the National Law o f  the United States, 101 U .  PA. L. REV. 26, 45 
(1952) (citation omitted). 
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federal government. The Preamble to the Constitution makes clear that it is 
"[wle the People of the United States," who are attempting to form (obvi- 
ously between the states within the United States) "a more perfect Union," 
and that "this Constitution for the United States of America" was "ordain[ed] 
and establish[edIw to "establish Justice [presumably within the American sys- 
tem], insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote 
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
P o ~ t e r i t y . " ~ ~  The specific articles of the Constitution, true to the document's 
intention, provide for the internal allocation of authority within the United 
States and not within the international community. For example, it is clear, 
from the context of Article 111's identification of the limited subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other federal courts to be established, 
that Article 111 provides an alternative to state court jurisdiction, and is not 
intended to allocate authority between the United States and foreign 
courts.69 Likewise, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV requires 
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."70 Thus, the Consti- 
tution establishes once again the deference that the fifty states within the 
Union owe to each other. Nowhere does the Constitution impose similar 
obligations upon the nation-states of the worlde71 These obligations, it is 
68. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). Without the benefit of my editing, the original 
reads: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the gen- 
eral Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
Id.  
69. According to Article 111, the judicial power of the national authority was to "be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 1. Article 111, Section 2 enumerates specific areas of 
subject matter jurisdiction for the exercise of the national, as opposed to state, judicial power. 
U.S. CONST. art. 111, 9 2. Alexander Hamilton specifically addressed the way in which judicial 
authority to resolve disputes with foreign implications should be allocated between American 
courts: 
"The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its 
members. . . . So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve 
national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in 
which they are concerned to the national tribunals." 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 9 1. 
71. It is well-established that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies 
only between states of the United States. The satisfaction of judgments between courts of differ- 
ent nation-states is determined in accordance with international principles of comity. See Arthur 
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a 
Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1968) (discussing inherent differences be- 
tween American and international practice); cf. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law,  32 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991) (exploring meanings and origins of comity in international law). 
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well-established, are within the province of international law and not the 
United States Con~t i tu t ion .~~ 
72. Canons of American legal construction provide additional support for not reading the 
Constitution to prescribe the grant of personal jurisdiction to the United States. Such canons 
hold that, unless indicating to the contrary, United States law should be interpreted as consistent 
with international law. In an often-cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible con- 
struction remains . . . ." Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804). Additional support is found in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, 5 114. 
("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with 
international law or with an international agreement of the United States."). See also id.  9 401 
cmt. b (observing that domestic law generally construed to avoid conflict with international law). 
While this rule generally applies to statutes, logically the Constitution should likewise be con- 
strued as consistent with international law, unless it similarly indicates to the contrary. 
One application of these interpretive rules is that American law should not be construed as 
attempting to legislate within the prescriptive domain rendered by international law to other 
nation-states. International law under the paradigm legitimately circumscribes the allocation of 
personal jurisdiction to nation-states, while the Constitution does not indicate an intention to 
prescribe the allocation of personal jurisdiction to the United States. (The Constitution makes 
no explicit reference to personal jurisdiction and in fact only makes reference to the relationship 
of the judicial arms of the various states to each other directly in the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV.) In accordance with these canons of construction, therefore, the 
Constitution should not be interpreted as intending to prescribe the allocation of personal juris- 
diction between the United States and Mexico. 
Another application is that the Constitution would be usurping international law's substan- 
tive limitation on the proper means of ascertaining jurisdiction over offshore defendants to the 
extent that the Court's acceptance of jurisdiction implied that the constitutional grant of per- 
sonal jurisdiction to the United States was broader than that allowed by international law. The 
Charming Betsy case is commonly cited to invoke international norms of comity or abstention in 
controversies regarding the extraterritorial reach of domestic statutes. See, e.g., McCulloch v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,21 (1963) (holding that jurisdictional 
provisions of National Labor Relations Act must be interpreted consistent with "well-estab- 
lished rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs 
of a ship"). For a discussion of the Charming Betsy principle as providing, in part, a "jurisdic- 
tional imperative" by requiring a specialized rationale for the rebuttable presumption that all 
legislation is territorial, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of 
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1144, 1197 (1990) (maintaining that 
Charming Betsy principle should take on "heightened practical and theoretical significance"; for 
example, offering "an affirmative warrant for applying the substantive international standards in 
the construction of domestic statutes" in light of contemporary international legal developments 
and rise of statutes in domestic law). 
While canons of construction can be helpful in reinforcing our interpretation of the Consti- 
tution as consistent with this paradigm, courts should not attempt to ascertain this law by con- 
ducting an exercise in constitutional interpretation. Because the understanding of personal 
jurisdiction informing both the Constitution and international law similarly conforms to a para- 
digm which sees international law as the source of the grant of jurisdiction to the United States, 
courts might correctly conclude that the same international doctrine would result by either look- 
ing directly to international law or by interpreting the intention of the Constitution. However, a 
clear implication of the paradigm is that since the United States cannot generate its own jurisdic- 
tion, it follows that it would be ultra vires for United States law, even constitutional law, to 
attempt to prescribe the international parameters of its jurisdiction to adjudicate. It would, 
therefore, be improper under the paradigm for courts to attempt to ascertain this law by con- 
ducting an exercise in constitutional interpretation. 
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This understanding of the respective functions of domestic and interna- 
tional law can also be seen in the pre-minimum contacts American judicial 
doctrine of civil jurisdiction which, like the aspect of the modern law of crimi- 
nal jurisdiction that I am addressing, was designed to allocate territorial au- 
thority between sovereigns and not to protect the rights of  defendant^.^^ 
Justice Field wrote the Supreme Court's classic decision in Pennoyer v. N e f f 4  
at a time when personal jurisdiction in civil cases was primarily viewed as 
allocating such territorial authority to  sovereign^.^^ The Pennoyer decision 
clearly implies an acceptance of the paradigm that the jurisdiction of the 
United States emanates from international law. Justice Field's approach to 
articulating the American requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant was to analogize the "well-established principles of public 
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and 
property" to the American internal system created under our C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~  
The Justice wrote: 
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect 
independent, many of the rights and powers which originally be- 
longed to them being now vested in the government created by the 
Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instru- 
73. For distinguished commentary discussing the early territorial principles underlying the 
law of personal jurisdiction, see Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 257-74 (1990) ('jurisdiction necessary to maintain state sovereignty in 
applying Full Faith and Credit provision); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-76 (1989) (federal common-law rules of 
jurisdiction based on territorial rules); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territori- 
ality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 27-32 (1992) (jurisdiction of court necessary 
to give effect to Full Faith and Credit provision of Constitution). But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, 
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE 
L.J. 289, 303-08 (1956) (questioning extent to which territorial approach to jurisdiction was ever 
actually accepted); Hazard, supra note 26, at 245-62 (source of territorial rule found in Pennoyer 
was fiction invented by Joseph Story in 1834). 
74. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
75. Id. at 732-36. This concern with the allocation of sovereign authority was a legacy of 
medieval legal concepts drawn from English common law. In order for the courts to assert 
jurisdiction over civil defendants in the early days of the common law, such defendants, like 
criminal defendants today, had to be present before the court. See supra note 38 and accompa- 
nying text. The presence of the defendant was required to ensure that the Court could enforce a 
potential judgment against him as well as to ensure the proper functioning of what were called 
"trials by ordeal." ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 5 2.02(2)(a), at 2-12-13 
(1991) (posting bond in amount that would cover any anticipated judgment would release de- 
fendant). To gain the defendant's presence, many civil lawsuits began with the actual arrest of 
the defendant under what was called, "a writ of capias ad respondendum." Id. The need for 
such arrests had the same potential for conflicts with other sovereigns that exist today in criminal 
jurisdiction. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. While the presence of the defendant was 
no longer required by the time of Pennoyer, and arrest had, therefore, given way to service of 
process, courts had not yet changed their method of analysis. See generally 3 W.S. HOLDS- 
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ch. VI (1923) (discussing evolution of procedure and 
pleading, including process, in English criminal and civil law); Hazard, supra 26, at 252-58 (docu- 
menting effect of early English common law on American law of jurisdiction). 
76. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
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ment, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, 
and the principles of public law to which we have referred are appli- 
cable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property 
within its te r r i t~ry . '~  
By analogizing the United States' internal constitutional scheme to the 
international system, the Pennoyer Court acknowledged the existence of sep- 
arate preexisting international "public law" rules of jurisdiction between 
nation-states, and further, that the federal scheme under the Constitution is 
modeled on principles of interstate relations. Not only did Justice Field as- 
sume the continued validity of the international rules under our American 
system, but it would be illogical to reason that the philosophical underpin- 
nings of this system conflicted with the very international order from which it 
drew its i n s p i r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
77. Id. The passage goes on to say: 
As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and 
capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the 
forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obli- 
gations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and 
their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which 
property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, en- 
joyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the 
one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
persons or property without its territory. The several states are of equal dignity and 
authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power-from all others. 
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State 
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that 
no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject 
either persons or property to its decisions. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
78. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-36. Pennoyer is the most famous of the many cases of the time 
which, through such analogous reasoning, implied the validity of the international law of jurisdic- 
tion within our system. In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S (11 How.) 165 (1850), the Supreme Court 
refused to enforce a sister state judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause by analogizing 
the domestic law of jurisdiction to the international law of jurisdiction. D'Arcy, 52 U.S. at 175- 
76. The Court proclaimed: "We deem it to be free from controversy that these adjudications are 
in conformity to the well-established rules of international law, regulating governments foreign 
to each other . . . ." Id. at 174; see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) 
(analogizing American states to nations for jurisdictional purposes); Peckham v. North Parish, 33 
Mass. (16 Pick.) 274, 286 (1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611-13 (C.C. Mass. 1828) (No. 
11,134); M'Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 4, 7 (N.Y. 1819); Mali v. Keeper of the 
Common Jail (Waldenhus's Case), 120 U.S. 1 (1887); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 281, 284 (Pa. 1788); Campbell v. Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391 
(1851); see also Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. &v. 775, 
782-84 nn.23 & 28-31 (1955) (discussing cases addressing territorial limits on judicial power in 
reference to judgments, on state power to grant divorces, on state power to tax, and on state 
power to legislate). 
Patrick Borchers recently canvassed the early personal jurisdiction cases in support of the 
argument that "the Court did not intend to transform the substance of personal jurisdiction into 
a matter of constitutional law," and concluded that courts prior to ~enn&er consistently applied 
the international territorial principles of personal jurisdiction. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of 
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Having now seen that the international order is the source which grants 
jurisdiction to the United States and that this order does not permit abduc- 
tions, we must logically conclude that the United States does not have juris- 
diction over defendants brought to the United States by way of an abduction. 
As the starting point for its analysis, the Alvarez-Machain Court as- 
serted that if "the [United States-Mexican bilateral extradition] Treaty does 
not prohibit respondent's abduction . . . the court need not inquire as to how 
respondent came before it."79 Having framed the issue as such, the Alvarez- 
Machain decision is ostensibly committed to arguing that the extradition 
treaty, which it regards as the equivalent of a long arm statute,80 does not ban 
abductions. If the Court correctly assumed that the United States' grant of 
jurisdiction stems from the Constitution, which I have shown has been inter- 
preted to allow jurisdiction in abduction cases between states of the union,s1 
then it would have been logical for the Court to demonstrate that the extradi- 
tion treaty did not "legislatively" restrict jurisdiction and ban abductions. If, 
however, as I have demonstrated above, the source of the United States' 
grant of jurisdiction stems from international law, a body of law which clearly 
does not provide states with the original authority to assert such jurisdiction, 
then merely demonstrating that the extradition treaty does not explicitly pro- 
hibit jurisdiction based on abductions would not be sufficient to permit such 
an assertion of jurisdiction. 
The Court, starting from the erroneous premise that international law is 
not the proper source of the relevant jurisdictional law, could have attempted 
to prove that jurisdiction based on abductions is permissible by openly ac- 
knowledging that it applied the United States Constitution as the relevant 
source of legal authority for the United States' assertion of jurisdiction over 
Dr. Alvarez-Machain, thereby ignoring the international legal context alto- 
gether. The Court then would have needed only to demonstrate that the 
extradition treaty, acting as the equivalent of a long arm statute, did not ex- 
plicitly ban abductions. The Court implicitly realized, however, that such a 
the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25-32 (1990). John Drobak similarly canvassed personal jurisdiction 
cases prior to Pennoyer, and concluded that 
[ulnder the principles of international law as understood by these American courts, one 
country did not have authority over the citizens of another unless they or their property 
were within the borders of the country. The courts used this concept of governmental 
territorial authority as the basis for rules of personal jurisdiction. 
John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 I O W A  L. REV. 1015, 1022 
(1983). 
79. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992). 
80. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49. 
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demonstration would have been a meaningless interpretation of the extradi- 
tion treaty because the treaty was not negotiated within the context of the 
American constitutional system of jurisdiction. The parties rather negotiated 
it with the understanding that it was an international instrument whose terms 
were to be interpreted within the context of the international system. The 
Court could, therefore, only reach its conclusion that the United States had 
jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain by creating and applying its own inter- 
national jurisdictional legal order which conforms to the permissive constitu- 
tional one. The Court accomplished this convoluted reasoning by using the 
extradition treaty both as a vehicle to marginalize the international law of 
jurisdiction, and then as a means of replacing that law with its own interna- 
tional jurisdictional order that permits abductions. 
In reality, the United States-Mexico bilateral extradition treaty, 
although operating within the context of the international jurisdictional sys- 
tem, has nothing to do with abductions. Implicit in the territorial grant of 
jurisdiction to states is the legal right to exercise unilateral discretion in de- 
ciding whether to honor a foreign nation's request to turn over resident fugi- 
tives. While the Alvarez-Machain Court is heir to a long line of confusion 
surrounding the role of extradition treaties in abduction cases,82 extradition 
treaties only provide a mechanism by which states may mutually agree to 
82. While the Supreme Court had never before held that international jurisdictional law 
should be disregarded, see infra notes 107-38 and accompanying text, the prevailing belief among 
commentators and courts, including those who have refused to assert jurisdiction over abducted 
defendants, see infra note 112, has been that extradition treaties are relevant to determining the 
legality of abductions. The seeds of this confusion were planted by the method of analysis em- 
ployed by the Supreme Court in its first American overseas abduction decision, Ker v. Illinois, 
119 U.S. 436 (1886). In Ker, the Court did not directly apply international jurisdictional law but, 
because of factors unique to the time and manner in which that case was argued, felt itself forced 
to derive the controlling jurisdictional law from an extradition treaty. See infra notes 116-26 and 
accompanying text for an explanation of the Ker Court's analysis. Following Ker, courts have 
attempted to derive jurisdictional law from extradition treaties. 
When Ker was decided in 1886, customary international law was thought to be incorporated 
into state common law. Consequently, the Supreme Court considered a determination of inter- 
national law by a state court to be a question of state law, not subject to review or independent 
determination by the Supreme Court. Customary international law operating as domestic law of 
the United States only came to be regarded as exclusively incorporated in federal law in the 
middle of this century. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) 
(Supreme Court implying for the first time that customary international law is federal law and its 
determination by federal courts is binding on state courts); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 
9, 5 111 (1)-(2) cmts. d-f, reporters' note 3; see aLso Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in 
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (1984) (observing that, prior to Sabbatino, state 
determinations of customary international law were not reviewed by Supreme Court). The 
Court considered the international law of jurisdiction to be customary international law and, 
since international jurisdictional law had not been argued in state court, the Ker Court believed 
it could not independently apply this law. It stated: 
[Tlhe decision of [whether international jurisdictional law prohibits jurisdiction] is as 
much within the province of the State court, as a question of common law, or of the law 
of nations, of which that court is bound to take notice, as it is of the courts of the 
United States. And though we might or might not differ with the Illinois court of that 
subject, it is one in which we have no right to review their decision. 
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waives3 a part of that discretion and obligate themselves to turn over certain 
classes of defendants in the event of requests for e x t r a d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  Extradition 
Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; see Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 683 
(Supp. 1953) (pointing out that Ker Court limited to reviewing original treaty claim made in state 
court). 
83. Because in theory it is in furtherance of the rights of states that international law pro- 
vides for exclusive territorial jurisdiction, as Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange speci- 
fies, international law allows for exceptions to this exclusivity, "traced up to the consent of the 
nation itself." The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). This 
principle of state consent not only allows for states to prospectively waive, to the extent specified 
in an extradition treaty, their sovereign right not to extradite defendants, but also is currently 
presumed to allow for states to assert jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign states, 
provided the foreign state does not retroactively object. See supra note 40 and accompanying 
text. 
84. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933), which states: 
[Tlhe principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from 
treaty. . . . [Tlhe legal right to demand [a fugitive's] extradition and the correlative duty 
to surrender him to the demanding country exist only when created by treaty. To de- 
termine the nature and extent of the right we must look to the treaty which created it. 
Factor, 290 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted); see also Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 306 (11th Cir. 
1987) ("Under international law, as recognized in the United States, any nation has the right not 
to surrender fugitives, but instead to grant asylum. The function of extradition treaties is to 
create exceptions to this right of other nations."); accord United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
939 F.2d 1341, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992) 
(Court stated, in case arising out of the same events as Alvarez-Machain, where defendant was 
also abducted from Mexico, that "a kidnapping is a flagrant treaty violation because it wholly 
circumvents the extradition process, and with it the commitment of the United States to follow 
the rule of law in its international relations.") (case was vacated as a result of the Alvarez- 
Machain decision); Valentine v. United States ex re1 Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 ,  14 n.12 (1936) 
(" 'The treaty between the United States and Mexico creates an obligation on the part of the 
respective governments, and does no more, and where the obligation ceases the power fails. . . . 
It would be a great evil that those guilty of high crime, whether American citizens or not, should 
go unpunished; but even that result could not justify a usurpation of power.' ") (citation 
omitted). 
That general international jurisdictional law and extradition treaties function together in 
this way is supported by extensive expert commentary. As one prominent author explained: 
In the case of extradition, the refugee is outside the territory of the State where the 
offence has been committed. The State which decides on the grant of territorial asy- 
lum, that is to say, non-extradition, exercises its own territorial jurisdiction. In the ab- 
sence of an extradition treaty, its discretion is unlimited. Even when an extradition 
treaty with an exception clause regarding political crimes exists, such a clause is merely 
a reservation of the freedom which, in the absence of a treaty, the territorial sovereign 
would in any case be able to exercise. 
1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (3d ed. 1957); see also IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AW ch. XV (1966) (discussing in this chapter, titled 
"Reservations From Territorial Sovereignty," treaties as a "privilege and license granted by terri- 
torial sovereigns . . . [and as] waivers of jurisdiction . . . [and explaining that] the basis for such 
competence can only be by the invitation and consent of the territorial sovereign."); I OPPEN- 
HEIM, supra note 26, § 169, at 564 ("No other state may exercise its power within the boundaries 
of the home territory; however, international law does, and international treaties may, restrict 
the territorial sovereign in the exercise of its sovereignty . . . ."); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & 
E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (6th ed. 1976) ("[I]nternational law may 
lead to a limitation of territorial jurisdiction . . . as practiced on the basis of treaties . . . Extradi- 
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treaties neither ban nor permit abductions since they do not play a role in 
determining the preexisting obligation of states to respect the territorial sov- 
ereignty of foreign states.85 Therefore, as one would expect and as the Court 
acknowledges, the United States-Mexico bilateral extradition treaty "says 
nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain 
from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or 
the consequences under the treaty if such an abduction occurs."86 The Court, 
however, in concluding that abductions are allowed, draws the wrong conclu- 
sion from the treaty's silence. 
The Court, under the pretense of interpreting the extradition treaty, 
merely used it to imply a general jurisdictional framework which permits the 
United States to maintain jurisdiction over an abductee. The Court bolstered 
its conclusion by claiming to have looked to the treaty's "history of negotia- 
tion and practice."s7 The Court's first step was to portray the international 
law of jurisdiction as irrelevant to the issue at hand. While the Court vaguely 
admitted that the abduction may have been in "violation of general interna- 
tional law  principle^,"^^ it failed not only to explain the ultimate relevance of 
this law but also to mention its specific ban on abductions. Under the pre- 
tense that the only relevant issue the Court needed to address was whether 
the extradition treaty bans abductions, the Court illogically used the fact that 
the extradition treaty does not explicitly ban abductions to establish that in- 
tion treaties . . . allow contracting parties to  demand the surrender of a suspected or  convicted 
criminal from another State in which he has taken refuge."). 
One academic study specifically found that this principle provided a unifying theme in ex- 
tradition cases. The author stated: 
The chief policy underlying these decisions interpreting extradition treaties, appears to  
be that since the principle of the treaties represents a notable departure from the exclu- 
sive jurisdiction exercised by each party to the treaty over individuals found within its 
borders, a greater surrender of exclusive jurisdiction than provided by the treaty ought 
not to be sanctioned by the decision of a court when lawless actions have occurred. 
Thomas Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAW. 27, 33 (1971). 
85. Both international jurisdictional law and extradition treaties, however, perform in tan- 
dem to meet the dual systemic goals of securing the primacy of territorial jurisdiction while 
providing an organized mechanism to assure the ability of states to secure the presence of certain 
wanted fugitives. See CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL AW 237-45 (3d ed. 1934) (noting 
that under prevailing strict view of state sovereignty common interest in maintenance of the law 
has led to  development of extradition treaties); see also Research in International Law, Conven- 
tion on Extradition, 29 AM. J .  INT'L L. 21, 38-40 (Supp. 1935) (contending that extradition trea- 
ties provide lawful means for international cooperation in suppression of crime, given current 
lack of unified global system of criminal law). 
86. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992). Because the defendant 
was a Mexican national, the Court specifically focuses on article 9 of the treaty which stated that 
the parties were not required to extradite their own nationals. Id. (citing Treaty of Extradition, 
May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065). If a requested party did in fact choose not 
to  extradite a national, and that party had jurisdiction, it was required to prosecute the national 
itself. Id. 
The Court found that article 9 did not specify the only way that one country may gain 
custody over the nationals of the other country for the purposes of prosecution. Id. at 2194. 
87. Id. 
88. I d .  at 2196. 
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ternational jurisdiction law, which does ban abductions, is irrelevant. The 
Court stated: 
Respondent would have us find that the Treaty acts as a prohibition 
against a violation of the general principle of international law that 
one government may not "exercise its police power in the territory 
of another state." There are many actions which could be taken by 
a nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but 
it cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by 
Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between 
the two nations.89 
Having disregarded the significance of the international law of jurisdic- 
tion, the Court, by misinterpreting the meaning of two independent legal de- 
velopments, created a new international jurisdictional order that permits 
jurisdiction over abducted defendants. The Court accomplished this by inter- 
preting one of these developments as creating and the other as implying an 
overall international jurisdictional order consistent with allowing for abduc- 
tions. The Court then argued that abductions must be allowed because the 
extradition treaty operating within this order does not explicitly ban them. 
The Court first pointed to its 1886 decision, Ker v. I l l i n o i ~ , ~ ~  which it 
interpreted as creating a rule that American courts will always accept juris- 
diction over abducted defendank91 The Court inferred from this an interna- 
tional jurisdictional framework that permits jurisdiction over abductees 
between the United States and Mexico. The Court argued that because the 
Mexican government did not negotiate a ban on abductions in a subsequent 
version of the extradition treaty, the treaty permits jurisdiction. The Court 
further implied the existence of a jurisdictional framework that permits the 
assertion of jurisdiction over abductees by arguing that the treaty's drafters 
ultimately rejected language proposed by a Harvard research team which 
would have prohibited the assertion of jurisdiction over a b d ~ c t e e s . ~ ~  Be- 
cause "no such clause appears in the current treaty," the Court argued that 
the treaty must permit jurisdiction over abducted  defendant^.^^ 
89. Id. (citations omitted). The Court also claimed that "[rlespondent does not argue that 
[international jurisdictional law or the U.N. or O.A.S. charters] provide an independent basis for 
the right . . . not to be tried in the United States." Id. at 2195. It is unclear, however, whether the 
Court believed that the defendant's failure to make the argument relieved the court of the bur- 
den of considering the applicability of international law. Regardless of who should make the 
argument, the fact that international law independently prohibits jurisdiction in this case cannot 
be denied. 
90. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
91. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. The Ker decision did not actually hold that Ameri- 
can courts may accept jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international law. 
See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ker. 
92. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 (referring to that "prominent group of legal schol- 
ars sponsored by the faculty of Harvard Law School"); see Research in International Law, supra 
note 40, at 623. For text of clause, see supra note 40 and infra note 93. 
93. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-95. In article 16 of the Draft Convention on Juris- 
diction with Respect to Crime, the Harvard Research in International Law proposed: 
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The Court misinterpreted the meaning of both the Ker decision and the 
language prohibiting jurisdictions over abductees. First, as will be demon- 
strated in Part VII, the Ker decision did not hold that American courts could 
assert jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international ju- 
risdictional law. Second, the language that prohibits jurisdiction over 
abductees cannot reasonably be interpreted to imply that international law 
permits abductions. The Harvard research proposal did not attempt to sug- 
gest language for inclusion in extradition treaties so that they might reverse a 
generally permissive international rule. Instead, the proposal attempted to 
suggest language for use in a proposed multilateral convention codifying the 
existing international prohibition on  abduction^.^^ 
Even if the Court did not misinterpret the Ker decision and the Harvard 
proposal, these two isolated legal sources could not reasonably supplant the 
international law of jurisdiction. As I have demonstrated, the international 
law of jurisdiction is inherent in the very international paradigm upon which 
the international state system is basedeg5 
VI. THE DUALIST MODEL DOES NOT PERMIT DOMESTIC COURTS TO 
GIVE DEFERENCE TO AMERICAN VIOLATIONS OF THE 
~NTERNAT~ONAL AW OF JURISDICTION 
Even having assumed that the United States Constitution is the proper 
legal source that grants jurisdiction to the United States, the Court must con- 
tend with the fact that the international law of jurisdiction, which clearly pro- 
hibits abductions without foreign consent, still exists. To justify disregarding 
the international law of jurisdiction, the Court's decision, therefore, implies 
reliance on what is called the "dualist" understanding of the relationship be- 
tween international law and domestic law. The dualist model of this relation- 
ship, which the American judiciary has adopted, posits that domestic and 
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any 
person who has been brought within its temtory or a place subject to its authority by 
recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention with- 
out first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by 
such measures. 
DRAFT CONVENTION JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT O CRIME art. 16, printed in 29 AM. J .  INT'L 
L. 437, 442 (Supp. 1935). 
94. Research in International Law, supra note 40, at 445 (Comment). 
95. Even if the Court was correct in its interpretation of these developments, and even if 
international jurisdictional law was not so fundamental to the international system, these devel- 
opments would have, on their own terms, provided scant support for the existence of a positive 
rule of international law allowing abductions. The Harvard research would have at best been 
only implicit evidence of a generally permissive rule regarding abductions. It would not have 
created a law of its own. 
In regard to Ker, even assuming that the Alvarez-Machain Court was correct in its analysis, 
and that Ker held that if the United States chose to engage in abductions, United States courts 
would accept jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international law, one domes- 
tic decision would not constitute state practice sufficient to create a customary or special custom- 
ary rule preempting the general prohibition on abductions. See infra note 97 and accompanying 
text for an explanation of the law-making implications of state practice. 
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international legal systems are completely separate and distinct.96 As distinct 
systems, they each have their own sources of law and their own separate law- 
applying institutions. Emanating from the international system, international 
law is mostly created by nation-states through procedures which manifest 
their consent to be legally bound either explicitly through treaties or implic- 
itly through customary practice.97 Domestic law, on the other hand, ema- 
nates from an individual nation-state's domestic system. Legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and tribunals, for example, serve as law-making bod- 
ies in the American domestic system. International legal disputes are largely 
resolved through international dispute resolution mechanisms such as diplo- 
macy, international arbitration, or the International Court of Justice. Do- 
mestic legal disputes are resolved within the legal bodies of the particular 
nation-states, most notably domestic courts. 
The seamless nature of law, however, often necessitates that domestic 
courts interpret and apply international law despite this theoretically strict 
separation between the domestic and international legal systems. In the 
United States, for example, this is accomplished consistently with the dualist 
model by incorporating international law into federal law.98 This convoluted 
approach permits the United States to break international law by employing 
96. The doctrine of dualism is one of two accepted analytical approaches that have evolved 
in an attempt to explain the interaction between international law and the domestic legal order 
coherently. Unlike the doctrine of monism, which contemplates a single legal order based on a 
hierarchy of legal norms comprised of both international and domestic law, dualism is premised 
on the fact that the international and domestic legal orders are distinct. The monist-dualist dis- 
tinction impacts upon when a domestic court is required, as opposed to merely permitted, to give 
legal effect to international obligations. See generally LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 153-54 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the monist-dualist debate); Louis 
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864-66 (1987) (explaining monist and dualist doctrines). See 
also J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 
66, 68 (theoretical treatment of the relationship between international and municipal law). 
97. Positivist doctrine classically holds that the international legal order is based primarily 
on the principle of the consent of states. "It followed logically from. . . sovereignty that, if the 
states were to be subject to law, that law must emanate from the states themselves. Since states 
were sovereign and independent they could be bound only with their consent." John P. 
Humphrey, O n  the Foundations of International Law, 39 AM. J .  INT'L L. 231, 233 (1945). The 
primary way in which states manifest their consent is through treaties. Id. at 234. 
States are also thought to manifest their consent through state practice. "Customary inter- 
national law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a 
sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, § 102(2); see also id. § 102 cmts. 
b, c & reporters' notes 2 (explaining opinio juris and further defining way in which state practice 
becomes customary international law); P.E. Corbett, Fundamentals of a New Law of Nations, 1 
U. TORONTO L.J. 3, 15 (1935-1936) (suggesting more modern view of international law that 
recognizes norms of global law as imposing duties). Customary practice as so conceived refers to 
"law that is 'legislated' through the political actions of the governments of the world's States." 
Henkin, supra note 82, at 1562. 
98. But not all international law is incorporated into United States law. Only customary 
international law, as well as treaties and other international legal instruments that are specifi- 
cally appropriate for application by domestic courts, are deemed to be incorporated. All other 
international law is limited to application by state parties in international fora. 
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the "later-in-time rule." Since the most recent enactments of federal law 
take precedence, the courts are required to recognize the most recent federal 
law as authoritative even if such federal law is preceded by an international 
legal o b l i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
International agreements and international law are incorporated into United States law in 
the following manner: 
Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to 
international agreements of the United States, except that a "non-self-executing" 
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation. 
. . . The proposition that international law and agreements are law in the United 
States is addressed largely to the courts. In appropriate cases they apply international 
law or agreements without the need of enactment by Congress or proclamation by the 
President. Much customary law and many international agreements, however, do not 
have the quality of law for the courts in that they do not regulate activities, relations, or 
interests in the United States. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be 
self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by legislation or 
appropriate executive or administrative action. 
RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, $ 111 (3) & cmt. c. 
99. The "later-in-time" rule is established by the weight of authority. "An act of Congress 
and a self-executing treaty of the United States are of equal status in United States law, and in 
case of inconsistency the later in time prevails." RESTATEMENT ( HIRD), supra note 9, $ 115 
cmt. a. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution has been read to support the 
equal status of treaties and statutes and the later-in-time rule. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of 
like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the 
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two 
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to 
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are inconsistent, 
the one last in date will control the other. . . .") The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any TZhing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This Clause does not establish the relationship between treaties, inter- 
national customary law, and statutes. It only addresses the relationship between treaties and 
state law. It is accepted, however, that customary law is, like treaty law, international law and, 
therefore, both are indistinguishable in status from self-executing treaties. In The Paquete Ha- 
bana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Court decided that "[ilnternational law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. Consequently, customary international law is part of the law of the 
United States. Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, 5 111 & cmts. c-e & reporters' 
notes 4 (stating that issues of customary law "arise under the laws of the United States" for 
purposes of jurisdiction of federal courts); cf. Henkin, supra note 82, at 1562-64 (customary 
international law should be given authority equal to United States federal law); Jules Lobel, The 
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA.  
L. REV. 1071, 1100-14 (1985) (explaining that subsequent federal statute could supersede 
custom). 
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This understanding has at times been extended in American doctrine to 
allow the President, acting on his own authority, to violate international 
law.loO Noted commentators, such as Louis Henkin, have extensively and 
persuasively criticized this executive power. They feel this executive power 
contradicts the theory that international law is the law of the United States 
since the President is obligated under Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution 
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."lol Such commentators 
argue that since we are a nation of laws, the executive branch should not be 
able to act in violation of international law, when it functions as the law of 
the United States, anymore than the executive branch can act in violation of 
purely domestic law.lo2 
The argument that judicial deference to executive violations of interna- 
tional law under the dualist theory violates American constitutional princi- 
ples is persuasive. Such deference is, however, consistent with the more 
fundamental dualist notion that domestic courts can be directed to follow 
domestic sources of law rather than international sources of law.lo3 
100. This authority has been read into the Supreme Court's dictum that courts will give 
effect to international law "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act 
or judicial decision." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). See infra note 103 
for a more detailed discussion of this case. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, 5 115 
reporters' note 3 (discussing presidential authority to supersede international law or agreement). 
101. U.S. CONST. art. 11, 5 3. 
[I]f we grant equal status to international law and United States statutes in our jurispru- 
dence, it should follow that a constitutional act of Congress supersedes prior conflicting 
international law. But surely the principle that international law has status equal to 
that of an act of Congress does not give the President authority to violate international 
law. If the suggestion that an executive act may supersede international law is valid, it 
must have special justification, and it must be carefully defined. 
Unlike Congress, the President has no general authority to make law that might 
compete with international law as law of the United States. The President's duty is to 
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' a duty that applies to international law 
as well as to other law of the land. 
Henkin, supra note 96, at 879 (citation omitted); see Lobel, supra note 99, at 1116-17 ("No 
authoritative judicial precedent sanctions executive violations of international law."). 
102. See Henkin, supra note 96, at 881-82 ("Only new international law or a new treaty will 
repeal, or modify, a principle of customary law or terminate its status as law of the United States 
and relieve the President of his duty to take care that it be faithfully executed."); see also Lobel, 
supra note 99, at 1115 (proposing that a government of separated powers requires explicit con- 
gressional assent for deviations from international law). 
103. Even under the constitutionally questionable dualist rule, that the President acting on 
his own authority can break international law, there is a serious question as to whether this 
authority extends to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency. The major precedent 
cited for the proposition that courts should give deference to executive violations of interna- 
tional law is The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In this case, a United States naval 
commander ordered the arrest and capture, during the Spanish-American War, of two private 
fishing boats located off the coast of Cuba and owned by a Spanish subject. The boats and their 
cargo were sold, and the claimant sued for the proceeds of the sale. The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. at 679. The customary international law of war allowed for nations to capture the ships of 
belligerents during times of war, but prohibited the capture of small private coastal fishing boats. 
In holding for the claimant that the capture of the fishing boat was illegal under our law, the 
Supreme Court announced, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
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administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at 700. However, the Court 
concluded that "[flor this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations. . . ." Id. 
Courts have interpreted this language as supportive of the dualist proposition that defer- 
ence should be given to a controlling executive act over international law. But what would 
qualify as a "controlling executive act"? Obviously, in The Paquete Habana, the decision of a 
naval commander was not a "controlling executive act." However, in 1986, United States Attor- 
ney General Edwin Meese ordered the detention of two groups of Cuban refugees that came to 
the United States as part of the 1980 Marie1 boat lift. The first group consisted of Cuban 
criminals and mental incompetents. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1448 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). The second group consisted of those for whom there was no evi- 
dence of criminal or mental defect. Id. The detention of both of these groups was challenged in 
Garcia-Mir v. Meese. The court did not dispute the appellees' contention that general principles 
of international law forbade prolonged, arbitrary detentions. Rather, the decision rested on the 
authority of the Attorney General to violate this law. As to the first group, in accordance with 
the dualist understanding that later-in-time legislation takes precedence over international law, 
the court found that there had been "an affirmative legislative grant" of authority to detain. Id. 
at 1453-54. As to the second group, the court concluded that there was no affirmative legislative 
grant to detain, but found it legal, nonetheless, under the precedent established in The Paquete 
Habana. Id. at 1454. The court concluded that the delegation of executive power to break 
international law could be construed as delegated to the Attorney General. Id. 
Since such authority could be construed as delegated to the Attorney General, could it also 
be construed as delegated to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency? For a discus- 
sion of "when and how . . . the United States [may] violate international law," see Michael J. 
Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 
AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 750, 753 (1992) (concluding that "[tlhere is in fact sound reason to believe 
that the President cannot, without congressional approval, place the United States in violation of 
a widely accepted and clearly defined norm of customary international law of the sort that pro- 
hibits abduction"). 
Complicating this legal problem is that it is not factually clear whether the abduction was 
authorized at a level higher or even lower than the Administrator of the DEA. Former legal 
advisor to the Department of State, Abraham D. Sofaer, testified before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional rights concerning the kidnapping issue. In his testi- 
mony, given days after the Alvarez-Machain decision, Sofaer stated that those in "the State 
Department were never consulted" about the capturing of Alvarez-Machain, and added that 
they were "not even presented" with the idea. with regard to the usual chain of decision-making 
in these kidnapping cases, Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld stated at the same hearing: 
No one quite knows who approves these, whether they're done at the district agent 
level of the Drug Enforcement Administration or at the local Border Patrol level. 
When the inquiry starts, you get on the one hand deniability; the President himself 
didn't know about it. On the other hand, you get the head of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration or FBI saying; sure he was doing what I told him to do. 
We will never know. Everybody lies in these cases, and the notion that there is 
some sort of decision at high political level, that the President of the United States 
makes this decision, is contrary, in my view, to the fact in these cases. 
Kidnapping Subjects Abroad: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Civil and Con- 
stitutional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1992) (Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld); see also 
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run 
Amok, 31 VA.  J .  INT'L L. 151, 165-66 (1991) (discussing fact that despite "strikingly different 
versions of the facts . . . all explanations point to a unilateral abduction by bounty hunters acting 
at the behest of the DEA, with the approval of the Justice Department"). 
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The Alvarez-Machain Court implicitly relied upon the dualist model to 
support its position that it could disregard the general principles of interna- 
tional law. The Court stated that "the decision of whether respondent should 
be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the 
Executive Branch."lm The Court elaborated in an explanatory footnote that 
in the absence of a treaty violation, a "diplomatic approach," rather than a 
"unilateral action by the courts of one nation," is the better method for re- 
dress of such violations.lo5 The position that the Court should give deference 
to the "later-in-time" executive action, and that this deference should allow 
the executive to resolve matters within the international system as the foreign 
relations agent of the American state, is undoubtedly borrowed from the 
jurisprudential doctrine which has established the dualist model in the 
United States. 
Based on the Court's tacit assumption that the Constitution is the source 
of law which determines whether the United States can exercise jurisdiction 
over a defendant abducted from a foreign nation, the Court's disregard of the 
international law prohibiting abductions appears to be consistent with the 
dualist model. However, once we correctly acknowledge international law as 
the sole source of jurisdictional authority to nation-states, disregarding the 
international law is no longer consistent with the dualist model. 
The fact that the dualist model provides for two distinct systems of sub- 
stantive law does not imply that it provides for two distinct jurisdictional sys- 
tems. Rather, the model is based upon a unified global jurisdictional system. 
The source of the state's basic grant of jurisdictional authority to create its 
104. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992). 
105. Id. at 2196 n.16. In this footnote, the Court relied on an historical example drawn from 
the litigation in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), a case which was otherwise relevant 
to the decision, see infra note 112. The facts leading up to this case evidenced a diplomatically 
negotiated solution to a conflict between the United States and Britain, which transpired in the 
context of the Supreme Court having interpreted American legislation in a way the British 
thought violative of their sovereign rights under international law. During prohibition, British 
ships entered American territorial waters to supply alcohol to American distributors in violation 
of prohibition laws. Having failed to negotiate a diplomatic solution with the British, in Cunard 
S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1922), the United States argued that American prohibition laws 
applied to, and could be enforced against, British ships operating within American territorial 
waters. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124. The British argued that under international law American 
prohibition laws should not apply on board these ships because under international law they 
should be considered a part of British territory and beyond the jurisdictional reach of American 
legislation. Id. at 106-07. The Supreme Court held that international law allowed states to pre- 
scribe activities on board ships within their territorial waters and that it was Congress's intent 
that American prohibition laws should apply to, and be enforced against, foreign ships operating 
in American territorial waters. Id. at 128-29. Presumably, the relevance of this case is that, as in 
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court allowed the government to act against the interests of a 
foreign country. The lesson evidently drawn from Cunard by the Alvarez-Machain Court is that, 
freed to act without judicial impediment, the executive was able to successfully negotiate a mutu- 
ally satisfactory treaty with Britain. The two cases differ, however, in that the decision in 
Cztnard, allowing the United States to apply and enforce its laws against foreign ships within its 
territorial waters, was most likely legal under international law, while the acceptance of jurisdic- 
tion in Alvarez-Machain was clearly illegal under international law. 
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own substantive law-making system is, therefore, international law. While 
the dualist model allows a nation-state to characterize substantive interna- 
tional law as domestic law for the purposes of applying the law domestically, 
it does not allow a nation-state to characterize international jurisdictional law 
in the same manner.lo6 
VII. THE CONSISTENCY OF AMERICAN CASE LAW WITH THE PARADIGM 
UNDERLYING THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM 
Prior to the Alvarez-Machain decision, American abduction cases were 
almost universally consistent with the nation-state paradigm. While the exist- 
ence of the paradigm and its implications for jurisdictional law have been 
independently demonstrated,lo7 such consistency of application is corrobora- 
tive of the paradigm and its jurisdictional implications. 
This is not to claim that the courts have been consciously aware that they 
were applying the paradigm. In fact, there was a tremendous amount of con- 
fusion prior to the Alvarez-Machain decision. As I explained, courts and 
commentators in civil cases have pervasively viewed the Constitution as the 
source of the American state's grant of jurisdictional power.lo8 Some crimi- 
nal courts have likewise failed to distinguish between the international ab- 
duction found in Ker v. Illinois and the domestic abduction found in Frisbie v. 
Collins.lo9 Finally, following the Ker decision, courts and commentators 
have in their confusion universally attempted to determine the legality of 
abductions by way of interpreting extradition treaties.ll0 Indeed, one of the 
contributions I hope to make in this article is to articulate the relevance of 
this nation-state paradigm to personal jurisdiction in criminal cases. Never- 
theless, because the paradigm forms the basis for our primary understanding 
of the relationship of nation-states to the international order, it provides 
either consciously or unconsciously the intellectual foundation upon which 
such decisions are based. It is significant, therefore, that despite all this con- 
106. Even if the state could create its own jurisdiction, the "executive" order authorizing 
the kidnapping would have to be construed as not only authorizing a political action, but also as 
intending to create new jurisdictional law. 
If international law is the source of the state's jurisdiction, the only remedy for a violation of 
such law is a denial of jurisdiction. The Court could not, consistent with the nature of jurisdic- 
tion, find that an abduction which violated the international law of jurisdiction could be reme- 
died other than by refusing to assert personal jurisdiction. For example, simply punishing the 
officials involved in the abduction or suggesting that the country whose sovereignty was offended 
punish such officials would not remedy the jurisdictional infraction. See, e.g., Villareal v. Ham- 
mond, 74 F.2d 503, 504-06 (5th Cir. 1934); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 18-21 (4th Cir. 1931). 
In other words, the concern of a jurisdictional analysis, unlike the Fourth Amendment's exclu- 
sionary rule, cannot be reduced to deterring unlawful official conduct. U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
(establishing right of people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures); see 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984) (establishing good-faith exception to exclu- 
sionary rule and holding that the rule's purpose is to deter unlawful official conduct). 
107. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
109. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See supra notes 42-49, infra 116-26, and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 50-54, 82, and accompanying text. 
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 
fusion jurisdictional decisions are largely consistent with the nation-state par- 
adigm. The Alvarez-Machain decision is destructive specifically because it 
broke with paradigm-consistent precedent, by distinguishing violations of ex- 
tradition treaty obligations (a legitimate reason for domestic courts to deny 
personal jurisdiction) from violations of customary international jurisdiction 
law (not providing a legally sufficient basis for such a denial). 
Although United States courts have often upheld jurisdiction over de- 
fendants who have been kidnapped from foreign countries,111 they have 
done so in accordance with accepted notions of international law.lf2 Most 
commonly, they have done so when foreign states have not objected to the 
111. See generally Richard P.  Shafer, Annotation, District Court Jurisdiction over Criminal 
Suspect Who Was Abducted in Foreign Country and Returned to United States for Trial or Sen- 
tencing, 64 A.L.R. FED. 292 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (collecting and analyzing federal cases ruling 
on federal courts' personal jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign countries); Her- 
bert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Jurisdiction of Federal Court To Try Criminal Defendant 
Who Alleges that He Was Brought Within United States Jurisdiction Illegally or as Result of Fraud 
or Mistake, 28 A.L.R. FED. 685 (1976 & Supp. 1994) (collecting and analyzing cases involving 
federal jurisdiction over criminal defendants brought into territorial jurisdiction by illegal or 
irregular means). 
112. Prior to Alvarez-Machain, an important Department of Justice opinion concluded that 
of all the reported decisions of United States courts addressing an alleged violation of territorial 
sovereignty by international abduction, there was apparently no reported case in which a court 
found jurisdiction when the abduction was the subject of a formal diplomatic protest by the 
asylum state. United States Department of Justice, Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543 (1980). Only two cases could be 
found by this author in which the United States courts accepted jurisdiction over an abducted 
defendant despite a state protest. However, in these cases, acceptance of jurisdiction was argua- 
bly consistent with international law, see infia note 115, because the United States itself had not 
encroached on the foreign State's territorial sovereignty. In Exparte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. 
Tex. 1934), while the court is less than clear about why it accepted jurisdiction "under such 
circumstances," despite a state protest, the court made no mention of United States involvement 
in the abduction and in fact specified that a Mexican Army captain had so been involved. Lopez, 
6 F. Supp. at 344. In Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987), employees of a private Florida 
bonding company had on their own initiative abducted the defendant and, in fact, following 
Canada's protest the executive branch made great efforts to seek Jaffe's repatriation to Canada. 
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 307. 
Reported decisions of United States courts addressing international abductions are other- 
wise overwhelmingly decided consistently with the international law of jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Dominguez v. State, 234 S.W. 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (precluding jurisdiction based on 
reasoning that entry into Mexico by United States soldiers for purpose of apprehending criminal 
offenders was "a violation of Mexican territory contrary to the law of nations in the absence of 
consent of the Mexican government"); cf Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th 
Cir.) (holding that individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties 
in absence of protest by sovereign involved), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. 
Reed, 639 F.2d 896,902 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant had no standing to raise violation 
of international law as issue absent foreign sovereign nation's objection); United States ex rel. 
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-68 (2d Cir.) (upholding district court's jurisdiction where de- 
fendant failed to allege that foreign nations objected to abduction), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 
(1975); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.) (holding that only sovereign nations 
and not individuals have authority to complain about violations of extradition treaties.), rev'd on 
other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310, 311-13 
(N.D. Ill. 1934) (finding jurisdiction over defendant where foreign country had not objected). 
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abduction.l13 As I have shown, international law allows such an exercise of 
jurisdiction based on the theory that, if a nation-state does not object to an 
encroachment of its territorial sovereignty, it is deemed to have consented 
implicitly to that encroachment.l14 In addition, courts have upheld jurisdic- 
Cases involving the seizure of vessels in foreign territorial waters involve some of the same 
issues of violation of the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state. Although the jurisdictional 
implications of the maritime cases are compounded by the complexities of vessel ownership, the 
extent of territorial waters, and the laws of war, the cases generally support an analogous rule 
that international law is not violated unless the foreign state objects to the seizure. See, e.g., The 
Purissima Conception, 165 Eng. Rep. 844, 845 (1805) (Sir William Scott) ("The privilege of 
territory will not itself enure to the protection of property, unless the state from which that 
protection is due, steps forward to assert the right."); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 
(1932); Hudson v. Guester, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281,284-85 (1810); see also Edwin D. Dickinson, 
Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J .  INT'L L. 231 
(1934) (summarizing additional maritime cases in support of doctrine); Felice Morgenstern, Ju- 
risdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 265 (1952) 
(same). 
113. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for discussion of requirement that, under 
international jurisdictional law, when a state protests an abduction from its territory, the abduct- 
ing state is required to return the defendant. 
114. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. While the doctrine of male captus bene 
detentus is often used as authority to support the legality of assertions of jurisdiction-by courts 
over kidnapped defendants, the exception which disallows jurisdiction if the offended state ob- 
jects is what is most important. It is important to point out that some commentators have cited 
this doctrine for the erroneous proposition that courts have jurisdiction over defendants under 
international law regardless of the circumstances surrounding their capture. E.g., Halberstam, 
supra note 61, at 737-38 (noting that "person improperly seized may nevertheless properly be 
brought to trial"); Bifani, supra note 61, at 676 (noting that notwithstanding illegal apprehen- 
sion, state can retain jurisdiction); Campbell, supra note 61, at 410 (noting that "illegal appre- 
hension does not preclude jurisdiction"); McCarthy, supra note 61, at 1071-72 (noting that 
forcible abduction, standing alone, will not defeat jurisdiction). 
The exception which disallows jurisdiction if the offended state objects is central to this 
doctrine and should not be read out of it. Based on the theory that the territorial interest being 
compromised is that of the state, not the defendant, only an objection by the state should invali- 
date jurisdiction. Reported decisions indicate that often the foreign state does not object. 
Therefore, jurisdiction is allowed since the state of asylum participated, acknowledged, or acqui- 
esced in the arrest. E.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1886) (Peru did not object to 
proceeding; private detective did not conform to extradition treaty requirements); The Merino, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 402-03 (1824) (American-owned vessels seized in Spanish territory of 
Pensacola while Pensacola was in possession of the American army; Spain did not object); The 
Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102, 104 (1815) (finding seizure of American vessel within 
territorial jurisdiction of foreign power offence against that power; no objection made by Spain); 
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.) (no violation because Honduran gov- 
ernment did not protest abduction), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Toro, 840 
F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988) (no violation despite defendant's removal from Panama by DEA 
agents acting without compliance to extradition procedures because no State objection); United 
States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (no protest by Guatemala or Belize to 
defendant's removal); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 1983) (no United 
States officer or agent ever entered Italian territory; Italy never asserted any violation of its 
rights of sovereignty); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (no violation 
where Bahamian government did not protest defendant's abduction); United States v. Marzano, 
537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976) (despite FBI's involvement, including meetings with foreign 
police officers and paying defendant's airfare, court found foreign official action "totally volun- 
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tion when the kidnapping was not authorized by the United States govern- 
ment based on the traditional understanding in international law that only a 
nation-state can violate international law.l15 
Ironically, despite its fundamental departure from precedent, the Alva- 
rez-Machain Court implicitly justified its reliance on the United States-Mexi- 
can bilateral extradition treaty, and not on international jurisdictional law, by 
deferring to the precedent established in Ker v. Illinois,l16 the classic 1886 
tary"; no illegal seizure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 
70-71 (2d Cir.) (holding that in absence of direct evidence of any misconduct or awareness on 
part of United States Government or its representatives, court's power to adjudicate not im- 
paired by forcible abduction following torture by Chilean police), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 
(1975); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.) (holding that, absent 
allegations of torture or brutality, abduction alone insufficient to divest court of jurisdiction; no 
violation of international law since foreign state had not protested), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 
(1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (escaped United States con- 
vict forcibly deported to federal authorities by Peru officials; extradition treaty not invoked); 
United States ex rel. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir.) (defendants deliv- 
ered by Vietnamese to United States officials in Hawaii; no extradition treaty between two coun- 
tries), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th Cir. 
1969) (defendant placed on flight to Canada by Mexican officials which stopped at Detroit; ar- 
rested during alleged specially arranged health inspection when forced to alight); Chandler v. 
United States, 171 F.2d 921, 934-35 (1st Cir. 1948) (defendant seized on charges of treason by 
United States military forces in Germany in 1946; no effective intrusion of any state's sover- 
eignty because Germany's independent status was suspended), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); 
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C.) (no evidence that Lebanon or Cyprus 
objected or protested circumstances of defendant's arrest), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1934) (defendant forcibly 
taken by Turkish police on Greek vessel and delivered to United States agent; no objections 
from Hellenic Republic or Turkey); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 122 (1835) (Presumed Canada 
assented to forcible removal of defendant; "If they waive the invasion of their sovereignty, it is 
not for the respondent to object, inasmuch, as for this offence, he is, by the law of nations, 
amenable to our laws. . . . were this an attempt to subject the prisoner to the exercise of our 
jurisdiction, in a case not confessedly within it, the case would be different."). 
115. In some instances, no violation of international law occurred because individuals were 
kidnapped in other countries by private persons or otherwise brought within the jurisdiction 
without the connivance of state authorities. See supra note 112 (discussing jurisdiction in Lopez 
and Jafie as arguably legal under international law because, despite foreign protest, there was no 
state participation in abduction). See also Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 
1967) (removal of defendants from Mexico not initiated by United States as defendants had 
been deported by Mexican immigration authorities as undesirable aliens); United States v. 
Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir.), (international jurisdictional law not violated where Mexi- 
can Security Police brought United States citizen charged with espionage to United States, and 
Mexico did not protest), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). For cases applying an analogous rule 
for abductions between states within the United States, see Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 706 
(1888) (jurisdiction not precluded because "process emanating from the Governor of Kentucky 
furnished no ground for charging any complicity on the part of that State in the wrong done to 
the State of West Virginia"); State v. Ross, 21 Iowa 467, 471 (1866) (parties acting without au- 
thority in Missouri, brought to Iowa and re-arrested; court held "the State is guilty of no 
wrong . . . . The officers of the law take the requisite process, find the persons charged within the 
jurisdiction, and this, too, without force, wrong, fraud or violence on the part of any agent of the 
State or officer thereof."). 
116. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
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overseas abduction case. The Alvarez-Machain Court asserted that "[ilf we 
conclude that the [extradition] Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduc- 
tion, the rule in Ker applies, and the Court need not inquire as to how re- 
spondent came before it."l17 In other words, as long as the abduction 
violates only general international jurisdictional law, and not an extradition 
treaty, the domestic "rule in Ker" departs from international law and pro- 
vides that the United States may exercise jurisdiction over an abducted de- 
fendant. Ker, however, never held that the United States could assert 
jurisdiction over a defendant where the United States violated international 
jurisdictional law. 
While the Supreme Court in Ker found that the United States had juris- 
diction over a defendant who was kidnapped from Peru and forcibly brought 
to the United States, in that case the United States did not violate interna- 
tional law. As the Alvarez-Machain Court explained, "Ker was decided on 
the premise that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction . . . 
and Peru . . . did not object to [Ker's] p r o s e ~ u t i o n . " ~ ~ ~  In Ker, the Court held 
that the extradition treaty "was not called into operation" because the 
United States sent the defendant's abductor to Peru in order to seek the de- 
fendant's legal extradition and the abductor himself made the decision to 
disregard the treaty processes and abduct the defendant forcibly to the 
United States.l19 The United States was, therefore, not itself involved in the 
illegality of the abduction.120 In addition, as the Alvarez-Machain Court's 
second reference implies and the Ker Court addressed indirectly,121 the fact 
that Peru never protested the defendant's abduction or demanded his re- 
turnlZ2 is understood by international law to signify Peru's consent to the 
abduction and, therefore, renders the abduction legal under international 
1aw.123 
While the Ker decision, based on the prevailing view at the time that 
state interpretations of customary international law should not be reviewed 
by the Supreme only specifically addressed the fact that the extradi- 
tion treaty had not been called into operation, it did not find that it was 
upholding jurisdiction in spite of a violation of international jurisdictional 
law. In fact, for the same reasons that the court found that the extradition 
treaty was not called into operation, general principles of international law 
were also not violated. Thus, the Court's decision to recognize jurisdiction 
did not indicate the Court's willingness to disregard the general principles of 
international jurisdictional law. Based upon the theory that only a nation- 
117. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992). 
118. Id. (citations omitted). 
119. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 444. 
122. Id. 
123. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2180, 2193 (1992). See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 82. 
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state can violate international law, the failure of the United States to author- 
ize the abduction not only meant that the illegality of the abduction as 
outside the "operation" of the treaty could not be imputed to the United 
States, but it also, under the same theory, meant that the abductor's violation 
of general principles of international jurisdictional law could not be imputed 
to the United States. In addition, Peru's failure to protest the abduction con- 
structively authorized American jurisdiction because international law in- 
ferred Peru's retroactive consent to waive the territorial rights granted by the 
general principles of international law, and not by the extradition treaty.lZ 
Consequently, the Ker Court's decision to allow for jurisdiction in the ab- 
sence of Peru's protest cannot be construed to imply that, even though the 
extradition treaty between the United States and Peru did not ban abduc- 
tions, the Court would have recognized the United State's jurisdiction in the 
event that Peru ~ r 0 t e s t e d . l ~ ~  
It is possible that the Alvarez-Machain Court's interpretation of Frisbie 
v. C~ l l in s l~~- the  other major abduction case relied on by the Court- 
helped to form the Court's incorrect interpretation of the "rule in Ker."128 
Lower courts and commentators had read F r i ~ b i e l ~ ~  previously, in conjunc- 
tion with Ker, to create the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. This doctrine states that an 
American court will have valid jurisdiction over a criminal defendant regard- 
less of how the defendant came before the court.130 The Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
125. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
126. Despite the fact that Ker never actually made this distinction between general princi- 
ples of international law and extradition treaties, the entire argument justifying the holding in 
Alvarez-Machain depends on the assumption that it did. The Court concludes that "the only 
differences" between Ker and Alvarez-Machain was that Ker was decided on the premises, dis- 
cussed in the body of this article, that first there was a lack of involvement by the United States 
in the abduction, and second that Peru did not protest the abduction. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2193. Specifically, while Ker's abductor acted on his own initiative, the district court in 
Alvarez-Machain found that the DEA had hired bounty hunters specifically to abduct Dr. Alva- 
rez-Machain. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub 
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 
(1992). In addition, while Peru remained silent, Mexico vociferously protested Dr. Alvarez- 
Machain's abduction and demanded his return. Id. at 608. Without the benefit of a similar 
factual record, the Court attempted to fit the facts in Alvarez-Machain within the Ker holding by 
showing that the extradition treaty with Mexico was similarly not violated. To do this, the Court 
extended its analysis beyond the circumstances surrounding the specific abduction to an exami- 
nation of whether the provisions of the extradition treaty at issue banned kidnapping in general. 
The acceptance of jurisdiction over a defendant who is present in the forum as a result of a 
state-sponsored abduction despite the protests of the offended state, regardless of whether the 
extradition treaty specifically bans kidnapping, is clearly contrary to international jurisdictional 
law. Therefore, the effort at treaty interpretation would be in vain if the Court was otherwise to 
apply international jurisdictional law. The result in Alvarez-Machain is consequently dependent 
upon the proposition that violations of extradition treaties defeat jurisdiction while violations of 
general principles of international law do not. 
127. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
128. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. 
129. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Frisbie. 
130. See generally Scott, supra note 36, at 95-99 (examining Ker-Frisbie doctrine and criti- 
quing Frisbie decision). 
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has primarily been used to allow jurisdiction despite illegal arrests131 or 
kidnappings between states within the United States.132 This doctrine cannot 
be extended to hold that jurisdiction over a defendant illegally abducted from 
abroad will be recognized despite the objection of a foreign state. In addi- 
tion, the doctrine certainly does not distinguish between a treaty violation 
and a violation of general principles of international law as a reason for deny- 
ing jurisdiction. Because Frisbie involved the abduction of a defendant from 
one state within the United States to another, the most that reasonably can 
be extrapolated from the case is that jurisdictional rules based on the fifty 
states' sovereignty, which are analogous -to international jurisdictional rules, 
are no longer applicable within the relatively integrated domestic fifty states 
o f  the Union.133 Therefore, neither Ker, read alone nor in conjunction with 
Frisbie, can reasonably be understood to mean that American courts have 
jurisdiction over a defendant illegally abducted from a foreign country de- 
spite its protest. 
The Alvarez-Machain Court also heavily relied on United States v. Rau- 
~ c h e r , l ~ ~  decided the same day as Ker, for the proposition that it could not 
recognize jurisdiction if the extradition treaty had been vi01ated.l~~ In Rau- 
scher, the Court held that the American forum does not have jurisdiction to 
try a defendant on charges other than those for which he had been extradited 
under a bilateral extradition treaty.136 The Alvarez-Machain Court inter- 
preted this rule, known as the doctrine of "specialty," as supporting the prop- 
osition that when a bilateral extradition treaty exists, the terms of the treaty 
limit the extent of criminal jurisdiction over offshore defendants.137 The 
Rauscher decision buttressed the Alvarez-Machain Court's interpretation of 
Ker, that extradition treaty violations can prohibit the acceptance of jurisdic- 
tion by courts over abductees while general international jurisdictional law 
131. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039- 
40 (1984) (illegal arrest case relying on Ker-Frisbie doctrine); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 
463, 474 (1980) (same); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 577 (1979) (same); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (same); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (same). 
132. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Arrest and Transportation of Fugi- 
tive Without Extradition Proceedings as Violation of Civil Rights Actionable Under 42 U.S.C.S. 
0 1983, 45 A.L.R. FED. 871, 878-79 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (examining wrongful extradition by 
abduction from one state to another); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule 
Relating to Jurisdiction of State Court To Try Criminal Defendant Brought Within Jurisdiction 
Illegally or as Result of Fraud or Mistake, 25 A.L.R. 4th 157, 162-72 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (juris- 
diction to try accused not affected when accused kidnapped and forced into state's jurisdiction 
from another state); T.C. Williams, Annotation, Right to Try One Brought Within Jurisdiction 
Illegally or as a Result of a Mistake as to Identity, 165 A.L.R. 947, 958-60 (1946) (right to try 
accused not impaired when accused kidnapped and forced from one state into jurisdiction of 
another). 
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
134. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
135. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992). 
136. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430, 433. 
137. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191. 
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~ a n n 0 t . l ~ ~  In Rauscher, however, where no abduction had taken place and 
there was no violation of international jurisdictional law, the Court, like the 
Ker Court, never held that courts could assert jurisdiction despite a violation 
of international jurisdictional law. 
In this article, I have pointed out why the paradigm underlying the na- 
tion-state system requires that each individual nation-state apply the interna- 
tional law of jurisdiction in adjudicating issues of jurisdiction over foreign 
abductees. I have refrained from making any significant normative asser- 
tions. Now, however, I will make a few conclusory normative observations. 
The nation-state paradigm I have described, interconnected as it is with 
the notion of territorial sovereignty, has been less than an ideal way to organ- 
ize international social life. The system has led to recurrent and increasingly 
deadly wars, has been used to justify horrendous violations of human rights, 
and has encouraged states to sacrifice socially beneficial regulatory standards 
in their competition to attract scarce capital resources. Indeed, we have en- 
tered into a very hopeful historical period where the international commu- 
nity is reassessing many of the basic tenets of territorial sovereignty. 
The paradigm does, however, provide a coherent approach to allocating, 
on an international level, the authority to enforce criminal laws. With crimi- 
nal enterprises, such as those trafficking in illegal drugs, being driven by the 
same globalizing forces as legitimate commerce, the maintenance of such an 
approach is increasingly important. 
I do not assert that the present allocation of jurisdictional responsibility 
could not be improved. Various schemes could provide for nation-states to 
share with international or foreign authorities their right to enforce laws 
within their own territories. For example, partially in response to the inabil- 
ity of certain nations to effectively enforce drug laws, the International Law 
Commission has recently completed preparation of a proposed statute to es- 
tablish an international court. This court, in addition to deciding cases in- 
volving violations of fundamental human rights, would be charged with 
hearing drug cases. Many, including some within the DEA, would be sup- 
portive of such schemes based on their belief that certain countries, such as 
Mexico, are not adequately deterring criminal activities that affect countries 
beyond their own borders. Indeed, in a different context, while they do not 
provide for direct enforcement of laws by foreign parties, the environmental 
and labor "Side Agreements" to the recently enacted North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are devices to internationalize the enforcement 
of labor and environmental laws among the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico. 
While a discussion of the relative merits of these kinds of proposals is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy for our purposes that these 
-- 
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proposals all emanate from a similar attempt to create a constructive and 
coherent alternative to the current international allocation of jurisdictional 
responsibilities. All are consistent with the paradigm supporting the interna- 
tional law of jurisdiction in that they only allow for the exercise of police 
powers in a particular country with the consent of that country. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Supreme Court's deci- 
sion in United States v. Alvarez-Machain. The Court, in its disregard for the 
international law of jurisdiction, confused the recognized international juris- 
dictional paradigm. In so doing, the Court failed to provide any semblance of 
a normative alternative. The Supreme Court's decision suggests jurisdic- 
tional nihilism. If used by other nation-states to legitimize engagement in 
overseas abductions and then applied by other judiciaries to permit jurisdic- 
tion over abductees, the decision can only lead to global regulatory 
confusion. 
